Things are very bad for Hindus in Bangladesh, and they are getting worse. If the West keeps pretending that Interim Chief Advisor is bringing a new democratic Bangladesh into being, we could see it become another Islamist state. Islamists are gaining power in Bangladesh, are elements in the interim government, act with impunity, and saw zero elements of their jihad against Hindus change with the coup. It is up to us. Do we want to stop the atrocities and the killing, the ethnic cleansing, BEFORE it happens--or would we rather erect memorials and cry every year to condemn and commemorate those horrors without doing anything to help the victims? We have seen that happen before. WAKE UP! Stop buying Bangladeshi goods. Bharat News just conducted an insightful interview with me about this. Please watch and listen to it:
The Silent Genocide of Bangladeshi Hindus (Indic Researchers Forum Seminar)
And here is the YouTube of the conference. My part is toward the latter part (at1:20:11). Thank you again to the Indic Researchers Forum. "The Silent Genocide of Bangladeshi Hindus."
An International Conference on Ethnic Cleansing of Minority Hindus, Buddhists and Adibasi Tribal of Bangladesh
https://timesofuniversal.com/?p=511
An International Conference on Ethnic Cleansing of Minority Hindus, Buddhists and Adibasi Tribal of Bangladesh was held at 26 October 2024 at Los Angeles, USA. The main theme of the conference was that no minority will be allowed to be expelled from the country.
BHBCUC USA, World Hindu Federation (WHF) USA Chapter, HRCBM USA and World Buddhist Federation USA jointly organized this conference. Mr. Kali Prodip Choudhury, Chairman and Founder of KPC Group of Companies was the chief guest oh this conference. Mr. Raja Khrishnamoorthy, House of Representatives, Washinton DC was the co-chair of the conference. Swami Shuvananda Puri was the coordinator and host of the conference. The leaders of different organizations and Human Rights Activists from all over the world was participated to the conference. Religious leaders – Swami Ramnath Mishra from Pakistan, Chinmoykrishna Das Bhramachari from Bangladesh, Venerable Bipulananda Thero from USA also attended the conference virtually. All the speakers mentioned that the world is aware of the religious extremism of Bangladesh. Brutal attacks on Hindus, Buddhists and tribals, vandalism of temples and idols, kidnapping, rape and forced conversion of Hindu, Buddhist and tribal girls, attacks on their houses, property grabbing are going on in Bangladesh. Hindus, Buddhists and tribals of Bangladesh are in a very vulnerable situation. All Bangladeshi Hindus, Buddhists and tribals living outside Bangladesh are deeply concerned about the situation of minorities in Bangladesh.
During the conference one minute silence was observed to remember the souls of all the innocent Hindus, Buddhists and tribals who have been killed since 1971 till date and the demonic torture of minority girls and women in Bangladesh. Candles were lit to protest against the persecution of minorities in Bangladesh.
Mr. Raja Krishnamurthy, House of Representatives, Washington DC, said that not only he, but all US Congressmen are concerned about the persecution of minorities in Bangladesh. He hoped that present Bangladesh government would take strong measure to stop the atrocities against the minority Hindu, Buddhist and tribals in Bangladesh. He said that the United States wants a peaceful, democratic and secular Bangladesh. He assured to stand by the vulnerable Hindus, Buddhists and tribal of Bangladesh.
Mr. Richard L. Benkin, Human Rights Advocate and Author of USA, said that minority Hindus are persecuted every day in Bangladesh. He pointed out that ethnic cleansing of minority Hindus, Buddhists and tribal is taking place only for the victims to remain silent, this is not the case because the rest of the world, the United Nations, international media, international human rights organizations are turning a blind eye to the ethnic cleansing in Bangladesh. He said, if we want to protect the minorities of Bangladesh, then we all have to protest together and stand-by the helpless minorities of Bangladesh.
Mr. Kali Prodip Choudhuri said ethnic cleansing of minority Hindus, Buddhists and tribal is happening in Bangladesh, in such a situation we cannot remain silent. He said we hope the present government will take appropriate measures to save and protect the minority Hindus, Buddhists and tribal in Bangladesh. He assured to stand-by the helpless Hindus, Buddhists and tribal of Bangladesh.
Dhiman Deb Chowdhury, President of HRCBM USA, shared the heartbreaking story of 78 years of violence against Bangladesh’s minorities that perpetrated against them from East Pakistan and continues in Bangladesh today. Governments have changed but the status of minorities in these geographical areas has not. It is a systematic destruction. Finally, Mr. Chowdhury reminded that the minorities of Bangladesh must unite and stand up for their rights and dignity regardless of differences. He said, the continued work of HRCBM in implementation of transitional justice. Atorney Ashok Karmaker, Chairman of BHBCUC USA, mentioned that the international community could not keep silent against the genocide of minorities in Bangladesh. He mention that the percentage of minorities was 39% in 1947 and it has declined to 9% only in 2024. He demand all to get support for all minorities in Bangladesh as well as of all global leaders to ensure a peaceful situation for the minorities in Bangladesh.
Mr. Shradhanand Sital, Chairman of GHRD, said that not only Hindus are being attacked in Bangladesh but also the process of expelling minority Hindus, Buddhist and Tribal from Bangladesh is going on. He demands the Bangladesh government to ensure the safety and security of minority Hindus, Buddhists and Adibasi Tribal in Bangladesh. Shyamal Mazumder, President of BHBCUC USA, said that from 1971 till today, Hindus are being persecuted in Bangladesh. He also pointed out that after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and left the country on August 5, 2024, attacks on minority Hindus and vandalism of temples have increased to a large extent, and he strongly protested against it.
Dr. Kanda Swamy, International Secretary of WHF said, persecution of Hindus and other minorities continues in Bangladesh. He mentioned that Hindus all over the world are very concerned about the situation of the minorities in Bangladesh. He demand Professor Yunus, Chief Advisor of Bangladesh, to stop atrocities against minorities and take strong initiatives to ensure their rights.
Richa Gautam, Executive Director of CaresGlobal spoke about the vulnerable status of minorities in Bangladesh. She pointed out that the international community and world leaders should take strong initiatives to save and protect the Hindus and other minorities of Bangladesh. Chitra Paul, President of Hindu Forum Sweden,
Mr. Ashoo Mongia, National Secretary of WHF India Chapter, said all Bangladeshi minorities are our brothers and sisters. He also said that it is our responsibility to protest against the atrocities of minorities in Bangladesh. He mentioned that India could not deny their responsibility to ensure the protection of all minorities in Bangladesh.
Mr. Dipan Mitra, President of WHF European Chapter, said that the minority Hindus, Buddhists and Adibasi tribal in Bangladesh are in danger today; He demands fair trial and exemplary punishment of the criminals in every incident of attack on minorities in Bangladesh. He demands an end to forced conversion of minority girls to Islam. He also mentioned that Bangladesh cannot have any state religion. He appealed all global leaders to stand-by the vulnerable minorities of Bangladesh and take strong initiatives to ensure safe and peaceful lives for all minorities.
Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal: "India’s 'Juggling' Relationship with Major Powers
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DGLcW-TuT0aQudQ6lWFpA74cKcddVA_8/view
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
The latest issue of India-based Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) has been published: “India’s ‘Juggling’ Relationship with Major Power. The issue contains online interviews with questions about India and its relationship with major powers. FPRC is an excellent institution, founded by Prof. Mahendra Gaur, and is opening a school focused on India and foreign affairs. I'm proud to be part of it. My answer focuses on India’s increasing geopolitical importance, how India’s actions reflect that. addresses how India's neighborhood relations must be seen now within the context of India's rise as a global superpower; and that as an American, I'm familiar with how a superpower is understood by other nations (sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse). My section of the FPRC journal is on pages 28-33.
Dr. Richard L. Benkin, Independent Human Rights Activist, Advisor Foreign Policy School(BHARAT) https://fpsbharat.com/
1. How do you look at India's "Juggling" relationship with Major Powers?
Reflecting India’s increased geopolitical prominence and power, its global relationships and actions are determined—and must be determined—by realpolitik. This takes a cold calculation of Indian interests, the risk/reward ratio, and what is in the best interests of India. As I have said numerous times within the pages of these journals, ultimately, today’s geopolitics are defined by the global struggle between democracy (led by the United States and India) and authoritarianism (led by China and Russia). India’s position is as tricky as any; and India’s tepid response to Bangladesh’s recent anti-Hindu atrocities is a good example of that. (Ironically, the global anti-Modi, anti-BJP detractors have been claiming since 2013, that this is a “radical Hindu nationalist government” whose first concern is to favor Hindus and marginalize everyone else. And of course, neither they nor their associates in the media have ever mention this dagger in the heart of their claim.) Complicating things even more, India has a very long and strong relationship with major authoritarian countries, Russia and Iran. And its relationship with China, the leader of that bloc, while one of competition and conflicting interests, is to say the least, complicated.
Now, the good thing about all this is that everyone knows who has relations with whom. Hence, the Iranian axis unleashed terror on October 7, 2023, as Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations drew close to formalizing their relations with Israel and joining the democratic bloc, with additional US ties as part of the bundle. That would have checkmated Iranian goals for authoritarian hegemony in the region and control of critical trade routes and assets. Moreover, we should consider the real possibility that those “juggled” powers don’t mind things unfolding this way. Regardless of the friendly meetings Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has had with Russian President Vladimir Putin, US leaders feel pretty secure that India’s relationship with Russia is nowhere near the level of their “historic friendship.” Even after the Cold War ended, you still found large numbers of Russian advisors and trainers in India, and Russia remained India’s biggest arms supplier until recently. In fact, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, noted that 2019-2023 was the first five year period since 1960-1964 that Russia did not account for a majority of India’s arms imports. Thus, it is no surprise that US officials periodically express consternation with India’s ongoing purchases of Russian energy and raise it at high level. But they have taken no action to stop it or even threatened it.
There is another critical factor to bear in mind. India and the United States (US/USA) are democracies that witness regularly scheduled elections. These elections often bring changes in government from one party’s dominance to another. The United States, for instance, tends to have a more robust foreign policy under Republican regimes that often push their nation’s advantages in global negotiations and conflict. Democrats, on the other hand, tend to opt first for building consensus, diplomacy, and accommodation, even if it means playing down US advantages. Similarly, India’s global profile and critical geopolitical dominance has come into its own, only since the advent of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government; whereas the previous Congress Party-dominated government was far less assertive in its international relations. But in neither case does that change of the party in power mean discarding previous geopolitical goals. It can mean different priorities, or changes in how they want to go about achieving their goals. The most successful countries are those that can in fact “juggle” their relations successfully, keeping adversaries at bay or at least guessing at what their next move will be.
India should, must, and is determining its geopolitical actions based on what is best for India. That, in fact, is the critical difference between Indian policy today and that of previous Indian regimes. As a friend and admirer of India who has been coming there for many years, putting Indian interests first, and not dwelling on how others want India to act, is the key to understanding why India is today recognized by most in the world as a global superpower with a trajectory that is only pointing up as we move through this century.
2. It's "A Tightrope Walk" so far as India's strategic ties with Russia are concerned. Do you agree?
Sort of, and only for the moment. Russia still has pretensions of being a great power. Putin and others in the Kremlin seek to recreate a new Soviet Union under Russian hegemony. (Putin has called the fall of the USSR the greatest disaster of the twentieth century—a century filled with great disasters.) But Russia’s failure in Ukraine, the economic and military dominance of Poland, and those former Soviet Republics and buffer states joining or moving closer to NATO make that highly unlikely. Russia is at best a declining power. Moreover, Russia faces extremely challenging demographics, as discussed in some detail in my entry in FPRC’s March 2024 edition. Its 1.5377 total fertility rate is well below the 2.1 rate needed just to maintain its population, which peaked over 30 years ago. It has been declining ever since. Russia began this century as the seventh most populous country in the world and will end it at Number 20, according to the most optimistic projections. The more pessimistic ones have Russia losing half its population by 2100. To show how serious the problem is, Russian media is where we see frightening headlines about those most pessimistic projections, not from Russia’s detractors. Russian planners have been sounding the alarm for years, but no one seems to be listening.
This is important because without its large population, Russia cannot sustain its economy. The Russian military, moreover, always has been characterized by its ability to send wave after wave of soldiers and to sustain unheard of casualties in order to outlast its opponents—something it seems to be trying with Ukraine but instead is making those pessimistic population figures ever more likely. And as both China and Russia lose population and witness economic and military collapse, both also will realize that they cannot go after either the US or India with any hope of success. In fact, more and more military experts see China turning its sights to Russia’s mineral rich east with a realistic expectation that Russia will not be able to defend it. (There also is a Siberian separatist movement that no doubt will give China an expectation of success. Eventually, it will be Russia that has to make the accommodations, not India. But even now, I’m not sure that India is really walking a tightrope with Russia. Indian leaders know what Russia can and cannot offer, and what they must continue to seize upon while continuing to develop. They also know that their interests lay with other democracies and the sort of opportunities that unleash and reward the talents of its giant population at home and in the diaspora. India’s relations with Russia play an important part in letting the US and others know that India is important enough and self-aware enough to make decisions based on its best interests; and the rest the world will have to work around them.
3. US ambassador to India Eric Garcetti, recently said that both India and the US shouldn’t
take their relationship for granted because “while it is wide and it is deeper than it’s ever been,
it is not yet deep enough”. Should the extreme fragility of the US-India partnership worry
India?
I agree entirely with Ambassador Garcetti that we want to see an even deeper relationship between the two countries, however, I do not think India should be worried. Even America’s strongest bi-lateral relationships experience periods of tension and disagreement. Political or ideological factors might have an impact on optics, but not on the relationship itself. The current state of US-Israel relations provides an example of this. US President Joe Biden has made no secret of his distaste for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, just as former President Barack Obama did not disguise his opposition. Biden has been critical of Netanyahu and Israel, once angrily telling the Israeli leader to “stop bullshitting.” Biden’s leader in the US Senate, Charles Schumer, even called on Israelis to hold new elections in the middle of an existential war, and throw Netanyahu out of office. There even have been complaints from many in Israel and the United States that Biden slowed shipments of critical weapons to Israel. Both Obama and Biden did something never done before by abstaining in a United Nations (UN) Security Council vote on an anti-Israel resolution. It has been US policy ever since the UN became an anti-Israel mouthpiece to veto such things. Obama and Biden both, however, wanted to send a clear message to Israel. Sounds like a relationship in trouble, doesn’t it?
It’s not. Biden has a problem on his left flank—which he and his party cannot afford to ignore in this election year; and it’s significant that Biden’s criticism of Israel and Netanyahu seems to have evaporated since he announced that he was not running for re-election. The left in the United States like elsewhere is for the most part anti-Israel and bleeds for the Palestinians, even those who engaged in or supported the Nazi-like atrocities they committed against Israelis on October 7, 2023. And as I noted above, the United States is a democracy; their elections bring to office people with different positions and constituencies to satisfy. Things get messy in democracies in which we cannot—and I hope do not want—to suppress views we do not like or have a single-party state. Optics aside, however, these spats did not stop the US from continuing to supply Israel with needed weapons; nor did it stop the US from participating (along with several Arab nations and, of course, Israel) in stopping the massive Iranian missile strike on Israel in April 2024. At the time of this writing, we do not know whether or how Iran will carry out its threatened attack on Israel; nevertheless, the United States has deployed numerous military assets in the region to help defend Israel from any Iranian attack. Does that sound like a relationship in trouble?
It does not, and India is on something of a parallel course. The same quarters who dislike Netanyahu dislike Modi as much and would love to see the US cut ties with both of them. They are almost exclusively on the left, although anti-Modi forces have some supporters on the Evangelical Christian right. My own analysis is that many in the West like their Jews and Hindus passive and subservient; and both men are leading their nations, which are associated with those two faiths, in efforts of strength and national renewal and independence. I was in Washington for Modi’s address to the US Congress, and there were large numbers of protestors calling for his ouster and accusing him of extensive and ongoing human rights violations; although more were there in support of him, as was the case with Netanyahu. This is the same drumbeat you hear from the same activists about Israel and Netanyahu. Leftist Members of Congress boycotted the speeches of both foreign leaders, though many more boycotted Netanyahu than Modi. But, as with US-Israel relations, look at action not words. The vast majority of American geopolitical analysts and policy makers realize and often talk about the critical role India plays along with the United States in stopping the axis of authoritarianism, and especially China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the US continues to cut its imports of Chinese goods, India is filling part of that gap and supplanting China in some American market segments. A clear majority of Americans see India (and Israel) as a friend and ally; as a people who represent a great civilization. So, India should not be worried about that sort of ideological activity; look instead at the solidary actions. Yes, former President Donald Trump was much closer with and fonder of Modi than Biden or Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris are. But regardless of who is elected President in November, and despite any statements critical of India, the US-India reliance will remain strong.
It would be a mistake, however, to completely discount any fragility in the US-India relationship. Though never enemies, the two countries have had some difficult history. During the Cold War, India committed the cardinal sin for Americans of embracing the Soviet Union and remaining distant from and even opposing the US on global matters. During that same time, the United States supported Pakistan, a cardinal sin in Indian eyes, and shared responsibility for the worst environmental disaster ever, in the Union Carbide chemical spill in Bhopal. So, this bad history still lingers for a dwindling number of people in both countries.
4. India-China relations are unlikely to see much progress in the coming times Do you agree?
As the Chinese economy—and pretty much everything else associated with that country continues its decline, and India’s fortunes continue their rise, Chinese leaders and the Chinese Communist Party will have to figure out how to live with that new reality. Chinese leaders still retain their goals of controlling sea lanes and trade routes through Asia and between Asia and Europe. Its Belt & Road Initiative might be failing at this point, with new investments unlikely as the economy and capital decline; but the CCP has not backed off its international sabre rattling with regard to Taiwan, its stated aim of replacing the US and the dollar as the world’s economic leader, or its aggressive activity in the nations that surround India: military bases and power centers (from land grabs in Nepal and Bhutan), friendly governments, and ports from Gwadar in Pakistan (i.e., Balochistan), to Hambantota in Sri Lanka to, and eventually Chittagong in Bangladesh, if China has its way with the new Bangladeshi junta. We need to follow closely how China might look to seize on the current unrest and lack of clear leadership in Bangladesh to complete its “string of pearls.” That is, there is a period between now and later in this century, during which CCP actions are a little less predictable because its material situation is changing more rapidly than its leaders’ ability to react to those changes.
And that’s a major point to take from this: what happens in the India-China relationship is going to depend more on China’s action than India’s. There is little doubt that demographic and economic forces are combining so that India will take over China’s position as Asia’s dominant power. It’s hard to see what China will see in India to buttress its current position, help it expand its influence, or even make it possible for China to take over Taiwan. If anything, Chinese leaders are far more likely to see India as an obstacle to its goals, especially as India’s own reach strengthens and its role in the democratic alliance grows.
5. There's no such thing as "strategic autonomy" in times of conflict. Do you agree?
Well, we saw that in action after Russia invaded Ukraine. Ever since former President Donald Trump came to office in 2017, many in the European Union (EU) urged the group of nations to move to a level of strategic autonomy and become less dependent on the United States. But Ukraine needed the joint help of the western world nations, and the United States largely called the shots. Besides being Ukraine’s biggest weapons supplier, the US often manufactured the weapons supplied by the Europeans. In fact, EU and US leaders touted the coalition that they built to take unified action in the conflict. On the other side of the war, Russia would have been forced long ago to abandon its Ukraine adventure were it not for the supplies of weapons and other needed goods it continues to get from China and Iran. It could not and cannot operate in a vacuum independent of those allies. Strategic Autonomy is the concept of a State pursuing its national interests without heavy reliance on other States. Throughout the pages of this and other FPRC journals, I wrote about India’s growing ability to act in its interests even if it angers others with whom it has alliances. But in times of conflict, things do not work out that way. The current Israel-Hamas (really Israel vs. Iran and it proxies) War provides another example. There is a strong sense in Israel that in the end, it has to be able to take needed defensive action regardless of who doesn’t like it. The extent to which that is possible, however, changes in a conflict. There is little doubt that Israel already would have completed its destruction of Hamas were it not for the restraining force of the United States. For instance, the US opposed Israel’s planned operation in Rafah, Gaza that would have destroyed the terror group’s last fighting battalions. The US requested meeting after meeting with the Israelis and demanded endless provisions for Gaza civilians before finally relenting. As a result, Hamas operatives and leaders were able to use the delay to escape the area and continue fighting in other parts of Gaza so that Israel has had to engage in conflicts elsewherein Gaza that previously had been cleared of Hamas. Be that as it may, I have not heard any Israelis thereby criticize the government, telling it that it should have ignored the United States. Nor should anyone think for a moment that Israel is not considering the needs of its Arab allies during the conflict. If it did not, the strains could have fractured an alliance that remains strong during the conflict. Ultimately, its peace depends on how keeping these other Arab nations as allies.
A case can be made for the world today being in a constant state of conflict. We can cite the overarching conflict between democracy and authoritarianism for global dominance or the regular and ongoing hot wars that have implications for that struggle and the nations that lead it. That suggests that strategic autonomy is difficult to maintain at any time, and it makes sense if we do not view strategic autonomy as an either/or proposition. Rather, we should think of strategic autonomy in terms of degree; and we have laid out a convincing case of how India fits into that conceptualization, for instance, strongly allying with the US but remaining one of Russia’s biggest energy importers. China certainly appears to act independent of other nations, however, it cannot do so without reckoning with the economic disaster that would ensue if western nations respond by reducing, eliminating, or placing high tariffs on Chinese goods. We must re-think the concept of strategic autonomy as a continuum, and one on which we all find ourselves differently placed at different times. A debate has been raging in the United States for some time. Since the Second World War, the US has been the major player in international efforts pretty constantly. Yet, our country was born with a strong principle to, as expressed by our first President George Washington, “avoid foreign entanglements.” That isolationist frame of mind among many Americans was the primary factor that delayed the United States’ entry into both world wars. In fact, sentiment against joining World War II remained high until the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. That isolationist sentiment remains strong among a segment of the American public today and has hampered, for instance, continued US aid to Ukraine. For those advocates, isolationism is the sine qua non of strategic autonomy.
The argument against this position is that regardless of how powerful our military, how strong our economy, how right our democratic principles; we cannot ignore other nations in today’s world. As we saw on September 11, 2001, the two great oceans on either side of us no longer provide the same protection they did through the first 40 years of the 20th century. All of us worldwide are interconnected in ways that determine the quality of our lives. We cannot operate without being dependent on others—whether they have critical markets for our products, are sources of goods we want or need; or whether they are friend or foe. We ignore that in the name of Strategic Autonomy at our own risk.
Exclusive with Mr Richard Benkin regarding the Hindu Holocaust in Bangladesh
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccdsDl8zYhI
Just now
My interview by TV Asia about the current anti-Hindu atrocities in Bangladesh. Vandana ji, the interviewer and longtime journalist, pointed out that this might be new to some people, but I started warning about it years ago; and successfully fought it. But post-coup Bangladesh, Hindus are being targeted and victimized with horrendous atrocities--and in keeping with decades of ignoring this atrocity, the world remains largely silent and entirely inactive in stopping atrocities. They will not lift a finger--unless Hindus praise jihadists and condemn India, Israel, and the USA. What makes Hindu lives less valuable than Uighur lives or those of other groups that the gate keepers of caring give a shit about?
Foreign Policy Research Centre Journal: "India's Turbulent Neighbourhood."
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Q2HoBVII8RMbAQKwYjrYU9P9ZV1JwFXn/view
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
The latest issue of India-based Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) has been published. The issue contains online interviews with questions about India and its "turbulent neighborhood." FPRC is an excellent institution, founded by Prof. Mahendra Gaur, and is opening a school focused on India and foreign affairs. I'm proud to be part of it. My answer addresses how India's neighborhood relations must be seen now within the context of India's rise as a global superpower; and that as an American, I'm familiar with how a superpower is understood by other nations (sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse). My section of the FPRC journal is on pages 23-29.
Dr. Richard L. Benkin, Independent Human Rights Activist, Advisor Foreign Policy School(BHARAT) https://fpsbharat.com/
1. Why are most South Asian states skeptical of India’s primacy in their own ways?
In a basic way, this is the same skepticism and distrust Latin American states have for the United States
(US, USA), East Asian states have toward China, and East European states have toward Russia. Part of
this comes from the fact that the USA, China, Russia, and yes, India, have to one extent or another
attempted to dominate neighboring nations, through both aid and direct or indirect power politics or
economics. India’s rise to superpower status, which will continue growing throughout this century,
requires its leaders and citizens to recognize that being a superpower comes with its own considerable
amount of baggage. As an American, I can testify to that. This is not to suggest that great regional
powers are solely victims of jealousy. Parochial interests and regional demands come together as
regional powers make strategic decisions. Sometimes those powers get it right, sometimes not. The
power discrepancy between those countries and others in their neighborhoods can and at times does
spark resentment by others and creates a prism made of personal interest and a sense of entitlement
at times by the powers themselves. No country can claim 100 percent infallibility, and great power
errors get magnified and used for propaganda when they occur.
When you are at the top of the heap, there always will be people who love to criticize you or take you
down, no matter how counterintuitive or wrongheaded, and apply double standards to what you do. In
addition, nations with significant power (military, economic, ideological) cannot escape being
classified in one or another ideological category with geopolitical implications. India, for instance, is
grouped solidly with the democratic coalition in its struggle with the authoritarian coalition. Peoples
living in great democracies like India, will see this as something good; but at the same time, those
nations who look to the other coalition for support will describe it as neo-colonial, fascist, and contrary
to so-called people’s revolutions. India has moved from a soft socialist economy to a capitalist one that
emphasizes growth and opportunity; and while that might be good for the Indian people, others see it
as unfair to groups that cannot compete in a meritocracy. Closer to home, India was roundly criticized
for repealing the special status of Jammu-Kashmir and repealing Section307. None of those who
attacked India’s actions ever mentioned that 307 was instituted as temporary or applied the same
invective to, for example, Spain for not giving its Basque or Catalan states special status; China for not
doing the same for Uighurs in Xingyang; or Russia for ignoring Siberia’s special status. Nor did they
mention the violent expulsion of Kashmiri Pandits that changed the demographic facts on the ground.
The examples are too numerous to list, and I would wager that if India helps Sri Lanka or Maldives avoid
major concessions to China in exchange for debt relief, or helps Nepal and Bhutan even the playing
field in their attempts to stave off Chinese land grabs, many will see these actions of support for weak
neighbors as “Indian meddling.” Know also that India’s previous actions—whether undertaken
primarily with good will, self-interest, or most often a combination of both—will be used by different
parties with their own interests to try to fit them into their ideological or self-interested constructs. It
comes with superpower territory. Superpowers like India must understand them for what they are
worth and act accordingly in its own, expanded set of interests; rather than allow them to tie up
progress and needed geopolitical actions.
A good example of India doing that well involves Israel’s defensive war in Gaza. While pundits and
politicians globally refer to the “Global South,” and how those nations favor Palestinians and Iran over
Israel; they always make sure to include “except India,” which remains a strong ally of Israel’s. And
instead of trying to make those critics feel better (which will not happen because the criticism is rooted
in ideologies that seek an end to a strong India); the Modi government has not wavered in its principled
policy and held firm to the benefit of the people it serves. The example that India is setting enables
other nations of the Global South to make ethical and geopolitical decisions based on the facts of the
cases, rather than being forced to follow some faux interpretation of global intersectionality; that is,
India’s example helps other countries put facts and their people’s interests above forced ideological
demands.
2. Besides China’s assertive behavior, political and economic instability in “turbulent neighbourhood”
is a cause for concern for India. Do you agree?
Political and economic instability is never a good thing for nations and others who wish to see a
continuation of existing structures and power relations. Given the hard-won benefits current conditions
are yielding for the people of India, instability in the neighborhood does indeed pose a threat. All but
a few of India’s neighbors suffer from some level of instability. While facing some, but not enormous,
civil rights challenges, Bhutan seems to be navigating successfully from a traditional monarchy to a
constitutional monarchy with a democratic republic. This does not include, however, its continued
persecution of Nepali Hindus, which remains a serious issue that, unfortunately, the world ignores. The
major threat to its stability is the Chinese pressure to cede territory that could become a battleground
between democracy and authoritarianism, India and China. Nepal, it seems, has never known political
stability as a modern state. It faced a dogged communist insurgency and the 2008 abdication of King
Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, and since then, not a single Nepali government has served out its full
term. In the 2023 election, the democratic socialist Nepali Congress was the to vote getter, but it the
second and third place finishers were both communist; and if these two parties (Communist Party of
Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist and Communist Party of Nepal Maoist Center). Initially, the Maoists
joined Nepali Congress in a coalition in the Saṅghīya Sansada Nēpāla (Nepali parliament). Less than a
year later, it broke with Congress and formed a new ruling coalition with the Marxists. There is no end
in sight for Nepal’s weak governments, which also are dealing with Chinese land seizures. India could
help both Bhutan and Nepal in maintaining their territorial integrity against Chinese aggression and by
neutralizing the external threat, help both countries achieve a measure of internal stability. That also
would help establish Indian dominance (vis-à-vis China) in Asia in general, South Asia in particular.
Sri Lanka did not emerge from its bitter civil war until 2009. With roots in the 1950s, the conflict was
between the majority Sinhalese and the Island’s largest minority group, Tamils. A Tamil insurrection
began in the 1980s even requiring an Indian Peacekeeping force a times. The conflict was marked, on
the one hand, with credible charges of genocide against the Sinhalese, and on the other, the Tamil
movement led by a group designated as terrorists by 33 countries, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers. From then until 2022, except for a four-year hiatus, the Sri
Lankan government was controlled by a single family, the Rajapaksas. But it would be a mistake to
conclude that this equated to social stability. Unresolved ethnic conflicts remained, and in 2019, a new
Islamist force began carrying out suicide bombings. That same year saw the Lankan economy start to
unravel and brought the population soaring prices (inflation continues to top 50 percent), essential
goods shortages, power outages, and crippling international debts. The latter included $7 billion to
China, the result of misbegotten attempts to modernize via China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Fuel
shortages led to schools being closed and people having to work from home. By 2022, the people had
enough, and Sri Lanka saw social unrest that continues to various extents to this day. At one point, things
were so bad that the government called in the military to restore order. At this point, the economic
catastrophe appears to have no end in sight, which means that India can expect serious instability
continue for its island neighbor.
The Maldives has had a series of national elections pitting candidates who were pro-Chinese against
candidates who were pro-India; thus making it something of a microcosm of the battle for supremacy
in Asia. In fact, until recently, Maldives had an “India First” policy in recognition of its giant neighbor.
In late April, however, pro-Chinese President Mohamed Muizzu won a landslide victory that gave his
People’s National Congress Party (PNC) a veto-proof majority in the parliament. It was a clear
repudiation of India, and even before the landslide victory, Muizzu began expelling the 85 Indian
troops there. That same month, he signed a military assistance pact with China. Muizzu, In addition to
free non-lethal weaponry, the pact has Chinese trainers replace the Indians and Americans who had
been training Maldivian troops. As significant as this is, however, Muizzu had India replace their troops
with civilian technicians, thereby maintaining some Indian presence. Given the immediate public
groundswell for the PNC and its pro-China stance, as well as significant Maldivian resentment of Indian
dominance, Bharat would do best at the moment to ride out the storm, and use its continued presence
to seize advantages on a pragmatic basis, and be a good friend to its archipelago neighbor.
Both Sri Lanka and Maldives owe billions of dollars to China, the product of misbegotten BRI projects.
India can play a key role in helping both nations find debt relief rather than repeat the Lankan handover
of Hambantota port to China. It can help them access international aid and loans, whether from global
bodies like the World Bank or individual nations; thereby getting both out from under crushing debt
and help them stabilize their troubled economies. But it will take both time and patience. These nations
occupy critical shipping lanes, which China covets and over which India must maintain control.
India’s biggest concern in this regard has to be Pakistan. There is extensive data supporting the
conclusion that Pakistan frequently flirts with the title of a “failed state.” Since its beginnings as a nation,
Pakistan has faced serious ethnic tensions within. The dominant Punjabis comprise less than half the
nation but maintains an ongoing policy that prohibits other ethnic languages in many settings, including
education, seizes valuable resources in ethnic areas, and has turned a blind eye when its own militias
or other terrorist groups attack these other groups. Pashtuns, Baloch, and Sindhis, who together make
up more than a third of Pakistan’s population are, at times, in open political revolt. The tensions,
moreover, have hampered BRI projects, which are key to Pakistan’s economic viability. Pakistan’s
patronization of terror groups, especially but not exclusively in and around Kashmir and in the
Northwest, operate with little or no limits, and undermine both the rule of law and a sense of security
among many Pakistanis. The country’s foreign debt is crushing, and interest payments alone will equal
almost 60 percent of Pakistan’s total revenue in 2024. The country is effectively a Chinese vassal state
that has allowed Chinese military vessels to take over its Gwadar port in Balochistan. Right now, the
only thing keeping the nation afloat is the infusion of cash from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
There is some evidence that it has had some positive impact on Pakistan’s very high inflation though
inflation remains high. Even as a new government was sworn in (after months of political instability that
followed the ouster of an Islamist regime), the AP reported “an unprecedented economic crisis, regular
power cuts, near-daily militant attacks and a challenging relationship with neighboring Taliban-run
Afghanistan.
Any perceived improvements are small bandages at best on a massive wound, especially if Pakistan
remains tethered to China; and it’s hard to see how that changes. Relations with the United States and
the west have been at a nadir from the time they found out Pakistan was sheltering arch terrorist Osama
bin Laden; and as long at the state remains under the thumb of the military and intelligence agencies,
it is impossible to see it turn to India for help. Making all of this even more perilous for India and the
rest of the world is that no one can dismiss Pakistan, which avoided defaulting on its debts only through
a massive infusion of funds. It is currently the world’s fifth largest country, with annual population
increases eclipsing every country except India and Nigeria. Its annual population increase percentage
is about two and a half times India’s. So, it’s not going away. This nuclear state is strategically located
in one of the world’s hottest hot spots. The four countries on its borders—India, China, Iran, and
Afghanistan—are all geopolitical axes that have interests in what happens inside Pakistan. Will it
stabilize with help from the IMF and others? Will it continue moving more and more into China’s arms?
Or will it become so unstable and so rife with division that it ultimately breaks apart into separate
nations or a federation of semi-autonomous republics?
3. Why is India working on developing an “extended neighbourhood” that involves islands in the
Indian Ocean, Gulf countries and nations in South-East Asia? Is it for a bigger, influential and ambitious
India?
As India’s superpower status grows, a number of geopolitical factors will push it to abandon a more
parochial view of its interests, something that has been happening now for at least a decade. But I want
to focus on one in particular: the economy.
India will not achieve its potential unless it develops new markets for its exports. In the five years
between 2017 and 2022, the total value of Indian exports grew by over 50 percent to approximately
$468 Billion USD; and for a long time, its biggest export destination has been the United States. In fact,
the total exports to all countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that
year amounted to only 38 percent of exports to the USA. Moreover, the USA is not only India’s largest
export destination, according to the OEC, it’s also the fastest growing market. Even now, India’s
immediate neighborhood is woefully incapable of supporting India’s export economy, and even the
capacity for that is nowhere near what the Indian people need. If we look at IMF figures for GDP, we
come to the same conclusion. The IMF estimates of the total 2024 GDP for all SAARC countries, except
India, amount to less than a quarter of India’s GDP estimate. Moreover, almost half of it comes from one
country (Bangladesh). In other words, if we take Bangladesh out of the mix, India’s immediate
neighborhood together has a GDP less than one eighth the size of India’s. And India’s economic
appetite is only increasing. Bloomberg, S&P Global, and every other forecaster predict that by the
end of this decade, not far off, India will have the world’s third largest economy, eclipsing both Japan
and Germany; and it will begin flirting with a $10 Trillion USD GDP that year. India’s immediate
neighborhood simply does not have the capacity for India to support its citizens. Neighborhood
expansion is an imperative for India. For instance, nine out of the top 20 economies today are in what
is termed the Global South; five of the 20 are in East Asia and Australia; two in West Asia. So, there is a
lot of potential even near by India.
Narendra Modi should remain Prime Minister for almost the entire decade, which means we can expect
his “Make in India” focus to continue generating greater need for export markets. Several other trends
make market expansion even more of an imperative. In the five years between 2017 and 2022, the value
of Indian exports grew by over 50 percent—and all of these figures reflect the export of goods; service
exports draw an even more dramatic picture. Moreover, according to the Indian government, there
was a significant growth in exports from February 2023 to February 2024, and that growth was fueled
by increased imports to the United States, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Singapore—no SAARC
countries were even mentioned. In fact, when the government reviewed its primary export
destinations, the only SAARC country mentioned was Bangladesh, which has experienced something
of an economic miracle over the past decade. We’re also seeing a decline in China’s exports, and that
trend will grow even more pronounced as the Chinese economy’s decline increases even more
precipitously as each year of China’s demographic disaster takes hold. While India is likely to remain
more of an agrarian society than an urban one for some time, it is seeing a decided trend toward
urbanization. From 2000 to 2020, India’s urban population grew by two thirds. The urban population
went from about a quarter of the population to over a third; and India is projected to add 100 million
more people to its urban population by the end of this decade. That means fewer Indians who can
subsist on agriculture and more who rely on manufacturing and the service economy for their survival.
The only way to support that is by gaining new markets, and the trend has been for India to supplant
others in the battle for consumer markets.
You cannot expect to be a major player in any nation’s economy unless you understand the priorities
and values of the buying population and succeed in creating a positive perception of you among them.
To support the latter point, look at the decline of China in the US economy as greater proportions of the
American population have strong negative perceptions of the Chinese government and the Chinese
Communist Party (not at all of the Chinese people). This requires an aggressive program globally and
in targeted areas. It is not a simple matter of low prices and a general sense of the market, which is
possible only if India expands its neighborhood focus. It cannot rely on its immediate neighbors, who
do not have the capacity, and a few markets far afield, like the USA, UAE, and few others. That would
make India vulnerable to geopolitics and buying patterns in those countries unless it diversifies its
export market portfolio.
4. New Delhi’s ability to deal with Washington and Beijing can be significantly enhanced if India
achieves greater strategic confidence in South Asian geopolitics. Do you agree?
Laying aside Americans’ valuing India for itself and the richness of its civilizational perspective, as well
as the increasing number of Indian immigrants who are contributing to the United States themselves
and through their decedents—Indians are now the largest Asian ethnic group in the United States—the
US values India for its economic dominance and potential for even greater heights; and for its
geopolitical importance, especially in being a bulwark against the expansion of China’s sphere of
influence. The former will continue to achieve new heights outside of a geopolitical perspective for the
reasons noted in the previous questions. The latter, however, is to some extent contingent on Indian
geopolitical dominance and leadership in South Asia. The extent to which India can turn all of South
Asia into a geopolitical bloc demonstrates its influence; the extent to which India cannot exert
significant control even its immediate neighborhood demonstrates its limits. That geopolitical control
is not the sine qua non for Indian influence, however, uniting often disparate elements shows
tremendous strength. This becomes even more critical given that gaps in that unity, right now, can very
well mean a Chinese foothold in the region.
The geopolitical significance cannot be overestimated: two nuclear armed states; one of the world’s
top economies; a region in which China has invested heavily and tied up a great deal of its wealth;
ongoing border disputes; and between one out of four and one of five people on the planet. To its East,
sits China and Southeast Asia; a volatile West Asia to its West; some of the world’s critical shipping
lanes; and to its North Russia and Central Asia. Add South Asia’s own hotspots to those surrounding it,
and it would be difficult to find a more strategically important area.
If we continue to define South Asia by the SAARC countries, the immense challenges that India faces in
presenting a united South Asian front become abundantly clear. While there have been a number of
signals coming from Afghanistan that its leaders desire some level of legitimacy among the community
of nations, it has not led them to expel Islamist terrorists who find safe haven within their borders. Nor
has the Taliban backed down from its retrograde and tyrannical oppression within its borders. From a
personal standpoint, I continue to work extensively with democracy advocates, people who support a
political landscape different from that imposed by the Taliban, and especially women’s rights activists.
Many of the last group not only face legalized rightlessness (and that is no hyperbole), but those who
have objected to their severe oppression have faced gestapo-like imprisonment and torture, including
sexual violence as severe as that suffered by Israeli women at the hands of Hamas. And there is
absolutely no sign that the Taliban would even consider changing that horrendous policy. Many people
in all of those Afghan groups have been brutalized and murdered by the Taliban as official policy they
consider to be in line with Sharia. Thus, it is difficult to see how India reigns in these excesses such that
Afghanistan can be part of one democratic geopolitical bloc—unless or until the Taliban and its ilk are
removed from power.
Pakistan’s integration into that same geopolitical bloc faces (perhaps) insurmountable challenges.
Pakistan’s debt crisis threatens to bring down the country, and the political instability that began to
resolve only recently has kept Pakistan from presenting an authoritative entity that could agree to
bailouts with the World Bank and other potential saviors. And a new government better get its act
together quickly, as a needed $3 Billion USD IMF bailout ran out in March. Right now, the IMF and credit
rating agencies estimate that the interest payments on that debt alone will eat up 50-60 percent of its
2024 income—income that is insufficient to service its citizens who have been facing shortages of fuel
and other essentials, as well near 30 percent inflation. At the same time, fully 30 percent of all the
foreign debt Pakistan has is owed to China. China is involved massively in Pakistan’s premier
infrastructure projects, all part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC, by the way, is
arguably the most important of all China’s BRI efforts. Chinese military vessels use Pakistan’s Gwardar
warm water port, located in Balochistan, and Chinese money and workers have turned it from a
backwater into a high capacity and strategic port. It is located close to Iran on the Arabian Sea and
close to the Straits of Hormuz. It could be used by China or allies to choke off western oil supplies; or
at least increase the time required to ship them and in times of emergency, troops. It also significantly
shortens the time and distance needed to get Chinese material and materiel to the Middle East.
Moreover, the faltering Chinese economy makes it extremely unlikely that the Chinese government
will forgive Pakistani debt or release its grip on Pakistan’s geopolitical strategy. Compounding that,
Pakistan burned a lot of bridges with western nations that could help them replace Chinese debt with
loan repayment in line with the Paris Group, an organization of lender nations whose commitment is to
help borrower nations, not take advantage of them in way China does. My own assessment is that
eventually, things will change as the Chinese economy contracts and its geopolitical leverage wanes.
But with that not in the immediate offing, Pakistan like Afghanistan does not seem a candidate for a
South Asian geopolitical bloc.
As noted in my previous answers, however, India has a number of ways to bring the other South Asian
nations into a more cohesive geopolitical bloc, which is not to say that it is without significant
challenges. Nepal and Bhutan are fighting border disputes, and China is trying to force resolutions that
further its strategic interests. If India helps these weaker neighbors withstand bullying from Beijing, it
will signal a geopolitical alliance with India making it happen. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have major
economic problems and owe much of their foreign debt to China. With the help of India and the United
States, Sri Lanka already has accessed non-predatory funds to help it reduce its debt to China and
stabilize its economy in crisis. The Maldives faces a similar situation in its debt with China, but its
population has responded by replacing a President who was looking for an alternative to its current
debt, with an openly pro-China President. With that, we should expect to see Maldivian foreign policy
to fall in line with China’s geopolitical positions. For instance, just days before the writing of this answer,
President Muizzu announced that the Maldives are banning all Israeli Jews from the country in solidarity
with the Palestinians, Hamas, and the China-Russia-Iran bloc. We should see more such moves,
however, Maldivian democracy could install a pro-western government in the next election. Perhaps
whether or not it does will be an important indicator of how strong India is in its immediate
neighborhood.
If India is successful in guiding South Asian geopolitics—especially if something happens to change the
dynamics in Pakistan and Afghanistan—it will lead a bloc so formidable and so strategically critical,
that neither Washington nor Beijing will be able to ignore its importance to them.
5. The Indian government’s policy of diplomatically isolating Pakistan does not seem to be succeeding
as Islamabad has stepped up its diplomatic efforts to engage Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. How far is
it true?
(I first refer to my paragraphs about Pakistan in answer to Question #2.) And yes, in many respects,
Pakistan has joined the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis, while India is firmly ensconced in the democratic
axis with the United States and Europe. At the same time, Pakistan is getting massive help from the
western-oriented IMF—which at least for now is in India’s strategic interests as well. India did not object
to the bailouts and for good reason. Left to its own devices, Pakistan does a good enough job itself of
alienating the West without India’s help. Its open embrace of the Chinese dominated axis and closeness
to it through the China-Pakistan Economic corridor; its decades of double dealing with the west on
critical geopolitical issues; its sale of nuclear technology and its role in trying to spread it; its pretend
democracy; and its ongoing support of terror and ties with terror leaders; has done more than India
has done or could do to end western support for Pakistan. Pakistan, however, is both a nuclear state
that is additionally located at strategic pressure points with major geopolitical importance. As such, the
West cannot stand by while Pakistan fails and so has facilitated the IMF bailouts and other fixes.
What has changed is that world leaders no longer speak of India-Pakistan conflict but of India-China
competition. That does not “isolate” Pakistan but marginalizes it as a force and severely reduces its
leverage over international events. Pakistan (with the possible but unlikely inclusion of Nigeria) is the
only country among the ten largest that does not have political or economic stability. Even if
democracies now find relations with Pakistan distasteful, the potential consequences of a fall due to its
economic and political crises would have global consequences, thereby making isolation rather
difficult to envision as viable, and making this “marginalization” policy far more effective in serving
India’s and the democratic axis’s geopolitical interests. If Pakistan fails, by for example defaulting on
its substantial loans, depending on when it does, the Chinese economy likely would be in no position
to right the ship. It its own economy and demographic disasters looming and already at work. Can
India, the United States and their allies be the only force capable of fixing the problem? And if so, will
that democratic access be strong enough to demand geopolitical compliance with their interests in
exchange (e.g., crackdown on terror groups, reigning in the ISI and its associated groups, relinquish
control over its nuclear arsenal to prevent it selling nuclear proliferation)? Or will Pakistan fall prey a
massive terror offensive from Iran, leaving India with a major terror state on its borders? Given
Pakistan’s fragility and its potential for becoming a failed state, isolating it from friendly life rafts is not
in India’s interests either.
What can we do about Senator Tammy Baldwin’s anti-India Resolution?
https://indoustribune.com/opinion-news/what-can-we-do-about-senator-tammy-baldwins-anti-india-resolution/
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
On November 19, 2023, I published an article in the Indo US Tribune about the anti-India resolution introduced in the US Senate by junior Wisconsin Senator Tammy Baldwin. This article is about its movement since then and what we can do about it and to stop the casual acceptance of slurs and inaccuracies about India.
Junior Wisconsin Senator Tammy Baldwin does not fit the profile of a bigot. As the country’s first LGBTQ senator, she has had to face bigotry more than being one herself. Regardless, that does not excuse her belief that allegations of Indian persecution of minorities—and in particular that Prime Minister Narendra Modi ‘Hindu nationalist’ government seeks to relegate non-Hindus to a second class status—without vetting alleged incidents that appear to support that; contributes mightily to the demonization of Hindus and India, much in the same way that many of her same supporters demonize Israel and the Jewish people based on their ideological assumptions. That India and Narendra Modi are ‘bad’ has become an article of faith among both the hard and soft left, facts be damned. This makes Baldwin an enabler of bigotry, in general, and of anti-India, anti-Hindu bigotry specifically.
Last October, she introduced Senate Resolution 424, ‘A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government engage the Government of India to seek a swift end to the persecution of, and violence against, religious minorities and human rights defenders in India and a reversal of government policies that discriminate against Muslims and Christians on the basis of their respective faiths.’ Unlike Senator Baldwin and many of her informants, and no doubt like many of this paper’s readers, I have spent a good deal of time in India; under both the current BJP government and the previous, Congress-led one. Unlike Baldwin, I do not have to rely on unvetted third-party accusations and believe I can offer her an informed perspective. For instance, the resolution cites allegations by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), but fails to consider that the US State Department, regardless of the party in power, has never adopted USCIRF’s recommendations or allegations against India. The resolution mischaracterizes India’s Citizenship Amendment Act. The resolution notes that 1.9 million citizens of Assam were found not to have sufficient proof of citizenship and claims that “they are now likely to be stripped of their citizenship by quasi-judicial bodies known as Foreigners Tribunals.” And that is simply false. What Baldwin does not know, and what her ideologue informants do not tell her, is that when Assam’s government got the figures and commentary, it put any action on hold until the data could be scrutinized more closely and any glitches fixed. That’s what a democratic government does and not what it would do if it just wanted to strip minorities of their rights. And, Senator Baldwin, Assam is ruled by Prime Minister Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
The good news is that Baldwin has not been able to get a single US Senator to co-sponsor her resolution, which has languished (untouched) in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since she introduced it on October 24, 2023. And that’s not for want of trying. I know for a fact that she reached out to several Democratic Senators, all of whom declined to support the resolution. So, this is not even a matter of partisanship or politics, but of ignorance and bigotry that informs Baldwin’s resolution. More good news, this resolution has almost no chance of passing. The bad news is that as long as Senators like Tammy Baldwin remain in Washington, the potential for more resolutions that blithely accept the false narrative that India persecutes non-Hindus also remains. Nor is that an idle threat, as we have seen recently with the left’s drumbeat against Israel and continued efforts at the local level to demonize India. We can expect such partisan efforts to remain a priority for India’s enemies with the re-election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ruling BJP; as during Modi’s 2013 campaign, I dubbed him “the left’s favorite whipping boy.”
There is only one way US politicians will understand that they owe their constituents better, and have to validate allegations before slandering one of our greatest partners with false ones. And you are a big part of it.
While some officeholders are committed to certain positions and principles, most take positions based on what the people they serve want; and as I learned more years ago than I would like to admit, a politician’s first job is to get elected. If they see that one approach gets them there, they are likely to believe it reflects their voters and will take it. If they see it loses them votes, they are not going to take it. India’s friends and the NRI community here can send a strong message to all US lawmakers by helping to defeat Senator Baldwin this year. She is running for a third six-year term, and should be in a tight race. She appears to be ahead at the moment, but Wisconsin (for now) seems to be trending Republican. Her presumptive opponent, businessman Eric Hovde, has six opponents in the August GOP primary, but he has received all the major Republican endorsements and has a large fundraising lead over his opponents. The November election will be between Baldwin and Hovde. To send that strong message, help end the bigoted acceptance of anti-India slanders, and let Washington know how important the US-India relationship is; urge everyone you know in Wisconsin to make sure to vote for Baldwin’s opponent in November. Besides voting, people also can get involved by making calls, urging others to vote for Hovde, and make clear that this is a matter of fighting bigotry, anti-Asian bias (which will resonate with other voting blocs), or even volunteer or make donations to defeat Baldwin. With Hindus comprising about one percent of the state’s population, and Asians about three percent (the greatest number of whom are Indian); this sort of active, principled, effort could tip the scales in what all political prognosticators consider too close to call.
It also should be seen as a way for NRIs and Hindus to let all politicians know that they are a group to be reckoned with and that bias against them will no longer be tolerated. A strong finish will send a message to all US officeholders that they cannot simply accept the unverified claims of ideologues, or hold onto prejudicial assumptions about India and Hindus. It will also demonstrate that politicians cannot afford to ignore the power of this fast-growing demographic group.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or ideologies of the publisher, editor of this paper.
Hamas rejects ceasefire: Antisemites and their ‘useful idiots’ will blame Israel
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
On April 9, 2024, Hamas rejected yet another Israeli ceasefire proposal. After many days of over the top anti-Israel rhetoric by US President Joe Biden and his administration, Israel yet again modified its proposal. US CIA Director William Burns presented it to Qatari and Egyptian negotiators, who represent Hamas, which will not talk directly with Israel. As has been the case in the past, in exchange for 40 hostages, Israel has offered to release hundreds of prisoners from Hamas and other terrorist organizations currently in Israeli prisons for terrorist acts. For the first time, Israel has agreed that some of those prisoners would be released despite their convictions for murdering Israelis. In addition to the prisoner swap, Israel unilaterally offered a six week ceasefire, the longest offered in any negotiations. They did so, even though it would allow Hamas to rearm and regroup, which would cause the deaths of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers.
Yet, while US President Biden and others claim that their concern is the safety of millions of Palestinians, they are not acting in any way to help them. Prior to Biden’s anti-Israel rhetoric, Israel already had undertaken unprecedented steps to minimize civilian casualties. And they have worked. Contrary to the false information spread by anti-Israel and antisemitic partisans, more humanitarian aid is and has been getting to the Gaza Strip than ever before. Israelis drop leaflets in population centers warning civilians—and not incidentally, Hamas as well—that they will attack certain areas, giving civilians the opportunity to flee, often with the help of Israeli forces. And again not incidentally, it enables Hamas operatives and leaders in disguise to escape with them. Even the UN, certainly NOT an organization that likes Israel, has calculated that likely civilian to military deaths in urban warfare should be about 9.5 to 1. In the Soviet Union’s war against Afghanistan, in which most fighting was not in urban areas, the ratio of Afghan civilians to military killed was almost ten to one. In World War II, it was about two and two thirds to one. While in Gaza, using unverified Hamas numbers of total dead, the ratio is about two Palestinian civilian deaths to one military.
Moreover, not all those civilians are innocent. There is extensive video proof of large swaths of the Palestinian population in Gaza, swarming the streets to celebrate the October 7 atrocities against Israel. And we need to be clear that they were atrocities, and contrary to all the rules of law their supporters claim Israel is not following. October 7 involved directed attacks against peaceful civilians, both ground attacks against families in their homes and young people at a concert, as well as missile attacks on Israeli civilians, including schools; and unlike Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel does not locate its military assets among civilians. There was atrocious rape and sexual assault that continued even in captivity; mutilation; the abduction of babies — babies that Hamas now uses as bargaining chips while their families are not being told if they are alive or dead. Israel requested that information, and Hamas turned them down flat to prolong the psychological torture. Some hostages since released have testified that Palestinian civilians — not Hamas terrorists — abducted them on October 7, 2023, and sold them to Hamas. Yes, that’s right sold them because their own official, written material and their media do not consider Jews equally human.
But even if we accept that many Palestinian civilians are free of blame, protecting them has little or nothing to do with the demands of Biden and the Israel hating crowd. There really is nothing else that Israel can do, no further concessions other than a complete surrender that leaves Hamas in charge. And for anyone who knows the Middle East, that will be hyped as a Hamas victory and insure more atrocities like October 7, 2023. Can Israel or any other nation be expected to agree to that? If Biden and the Israel-haters really gave a rat’s behind about Palestinian civilians, they would be pressuring Hamas to accept a deal that Burns said was a “good one” that they should accept. This is something the US can do since it holds a lot of leverage with Hamas’s representative in the talks, Qatar. Why aren’t any of them demanding that Egypt dismantle the wall it built on the border with Gaza, explicitly to prevent Palestinians from leaving Gaza for safety and temporary, refugee status? They complain that Palestinian civilians have no place to go, but they do. Or they would if Egypt did not block them from seeking safety from an active war zone.
Unfortunately, none of this is anything new. For instance, a range of people running the gamut from outright antisemites to Islamists to leftists to those who simply know little and like it that way; say that the poor Palestinians just want their own state in what is now called the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But they conveniently forget that at any time between 1948 when the British left and the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel had nothing to do with those areas. They were under complete Arab control. Jordan occupied the West Bank; Egypt occupied Gaza. Yet, Palestinians never even asked for it and nowhere in their charters and other documents even mentioned it as their desire. Did they send terrorists into those territories? No. Did they send terrorists into the occupying powers, Jordan and Egypt? No again. But they did launch regular terrorist, Mujahedeen, attacks against Israel. Yes. Their desire is the elimination of Israel and Jews, not a state on the West Bank and Gaza. This is why I have for years referred to Kashmir as India’s West Bank. Even today, the same terrorists make a big deal out of India nullifying Article 370 but make no mention of how almost the entire Kashmiri Pandit population was killed or expelled. And they can count on the same fact adverse people to join in their reflexive anti-India and anti-Modi propaganda, just like they can count on reflexive anti-Israel and anti-Netanyahu propaganda.
Sadly, even if we take Joe Biden at his word and believe that he really is doing this because he cares about Palestinian civilians, and not because he has to placate his political left to have any chance of electoral victory; his actions actually hurt those civilians. I was in Bharat on October 7, 2023, and a few days later, a top Israeli official warned, “that it’s easy to be with Israel when we’re the victims….you need to be with us when we’re the victors.” In other words, just as Hamas did, he knew that the weak-kneed West would waver as soon as Hamas and its allies started sending out pictures of the dead civilians. It did not matter that those who died did so only because Hamas deliberately put them in jeopardy by locating their forces in civilian areas. As a result, Hamas has been unwilling to compromise, especially after watching Biden — President of Israel’s closest ally — go out of his way to criticize Israel and threaten “consequences” if Israel does not, in effect, surrender. We saw this with Israel’s greatest friend, Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Under his UPA predecessors, as long as India took their orders from Europe, Pakistan and the terrorists it shelters attacked India with impunity. Modi, on the other hand, made it clear first with words then action that those days were over. And the terrorism stopped almost completely. In fact, when I was in India, people told me that Israel is fighting the same enemy as India is. And as if to prove their point, a few days after October 7, Indian security broke up an ISIS sleeper cell inside India.
The terrorist calculation changed once India did what it needed to do on Kashmir, without interference from allies. Now, for the good of all people in and out of the region, let Israel finish its job.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or ideologies of the publisher, editor of this paper.
Foreign Policy Research Centre: India's Foreign Policy 2014-2024
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zkyeGuSWmf5Ifjtzqd7pKUPAoJ_dQHO4/view
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin
This issue of FPRC journal involves five online questions about India and strategic issues in 2024. There are several interviewees. My interview is on pages 24-34:
.Before we get into the specific questions, I would like to establish a few general principles that drive the change that generates this discussion and is a major basis for my specific answers. The first is internal to India; the second is not.
In the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, my country dispatched then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice to India and Pakistan urging the parties to “reduce tensions” over the horrific attack and Pakistan’s involvement. Despite the fact that I tended to support President George W. Bush and still believe that Secretary Rice (once a student of the late Ved Nanda) is one of our brightest foreign policy minds; I was angry at their reaction and let some people know about it. How would we feel, I asked, if in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, New Delhi (or for that matter London or Jerusalem) sent officials urging us to reduce tensions; and of course, no one said they would have considered it a friendly gesture. The most common reaction I got was “What would you like us to do?” And my consistent answer was, “We need to stop treating India like a pet.” Because ever since India’s birth as a modern nation-state, that is how the rest of the developed world (both east and west) looked at it. Nor is it a simple legacy of colonialism. Like India, the United States (US) and Israel drove off British overseers, but did not get that same treatment. Germany was humbled and ripped apart less than 80 years ago, but today is recognized as the strongest economy in Europe and a force to be reckoned with. You might respond that Germany, the United States for the most part, and Israel in 1948 but not so much today, are white, western nations; and I agree that racial presumptions generate the sort of paternalism that India has faced. But that goes only so far.
I said that I had hoped India would have warned Secretary Rice to clear out of the area or risk getting hit by a missile, though in more colorful language; however, Indian governments before this one never even hinted at any like reaction. Rather, India remained passive and took no action, despite international consensus that it would be justified destroying terrorist camps with surgical strikes in Pakistani controlled territory across the line of control. Even in succeeding years, India caved when Pakistan insisted on several occasions that it would talk with India only if its role in 26/11 was not raised. Even when 26/11 was supposed to be the main topic of conversation, the then UPA government agreed to Pakistan’s demands. Moreover, I recall that during those years, it seemed to me that India’s referent was Western Europe and its brand of soft socialism, rather than its own millennia-old civilization and values. But that has changed, which is what makes this largely an internal factor. And it changed in 2014 with the ascension of Narendra Modi as India’s Prime Minister. Whether one favors Modi and his policies or not, no one can deny that under his stewardship, India has outgrown its old role. I doubt that today, any world leaders would even think of approaching India as anything but a powerful nation and people who demand and merit respect.
The external factor is the ever-shifting sands of the geopolitical landscape. India was born at the start of the Cold War and led a consortium of nations in forming the Non-Aligned Movement. While few in the West saw it as truly non-aligned (its principals were all openly communist or socialist), it provided a space where countries could—with significant limitations—try and craft a way forward without taking sides in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). Today, the USSR is long gone. While the United States remains the world’s dominant power, other power centers have emerged to compete with it economically (e.g. the European Union) and militarily (e.g. China). Today, China is encroaching on Indian territory, claiming parts of it as its own, and trying to stave off India’s rise as a legitimate competitor for the title of Asia’s dominant power. For India as a global power, non-alignment is no longer an option. In fact, India has become a leader in an international coalition for democracy and individual rights against an international coalition for authoritarianism and state managed societies. This grand conflict is arguably the defining conflict shaping today’s international relations for every major country. As such, even while India can and does pursue its own interests, regardless of whether or not they align with those of others in that democratic coalition; it has pulled closer to the United States in its competition with China.
“Strategic autonomy” is defined as a nation’s ability to further its national interests and craft its foreign policy strategy and decisions without being overly dependent on any foreign power or, we might add, foreign coalition.
It was a concept favored (but not practiced) by previous Indian governments and not used by Modi until his 2018 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue and his second term as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, under Modi, India seems to have achieved a significant measure of strategic autonomy, and that informs responses to all of the questions in this Foreign Policy Research Center dialogue. The war in Ukraine is a perfect example. There is little doubt that the United States would like India to condemn the Russian invasion; and there is little doubt that Russia would like India to support its invasion. Neither has happened, while India pursues a nuanced course between its two friends. Occasionally (and infrequently) some US leader or group will be critical of India—just as I hear anti-US criticism in India. That happens in free societies. But—and here is the key—the US government has allowed it to become an issue in US relations with India, nor has it tried to pressure India into a different course. Neither has Russia pressured India in the opposite direction. Why? Because India will pursue its interests no less so than the United States or Russia, and we recognize that. Strategic autonomy!
My answers to all these questions also rooted in the conclusion that democracies will in the end be victorious over their authoritarian adversaries, and it is a conclusion that I arrive at, even apart from my democratic preference and belief that freedom eventually wins over subjugation because people choose it. That conclusion is based firmly in the inescapable nature of demographic realities, in which direction populations are moving, in existing economic strength, and in the knowledge that market economies are always more successful for people than state managed ones. Along these dimensions, it is clear that China and Russia are declining while the United States and India are continuing to rise. My responses to the questions here are based on this conclusion.
In other words, even beyond specific matters, things internal and external are not what they were in 1947 when India was born, 1961 when it formed the non-aligned movement, 1991 when the Soviet Union fell, or 2013 prior to Modi becoming Prime Minister. Any notions that people carry over from those times have to be cast aside in favor of today’s realities.
1. India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar says: “Our status in the world has increased. No major issue is decided without consultation with India. We have changed and the world's perception of us has changed.” Do you agree?
I absolutely agree, and the foregoing discussion provides the basis for my agreement. One of the most important elements of Narendra Modi’s administration has been to get the rest of the world to recognize India as the major power it is. It checks all the boxes for a superpower: economic powere and continued growth; regional dominance; a strong military plus nuclear weapons. It also is the largest nation in the world by population and a key obstacle to Chinese dominance in Asia and beyond.
I have called Prime Minister Narendra Modi “a transformational figure,” and have written favorably about him here already. Yes, I admire Prime Minister Modi, generally agree with his policies, and like his geopolitical alignment with the United States and Israel. But that is not why he is a transformational figure. Even the impact he has had on radically changing political calculations inside India is not the reason, because political alignments are never permanent in democratic societies. It is only reasonable to expect that one day, the Indian people will drive new political dynamics, whatever they might be. As a foreigner who knows India well, I am confident that the seismic shift in India’s international profile and role, which Narendra Modi has helped author, is transformational. Minister Jaishankar’s comment that “no major issue is decided without consultation with India” certainly will be valid at least through the end of this century, barring unforeseen catastrophes or events. And even if things re-align in a different way after that, India’s role and the perception of it will never be what it was before this transformational change. As we Americans say, you can’t put the toothpaste back in the tube.”
2. “As a rising India and a consolidating US meet to create a new normal in bilateral ties, the past will no longer tarnish the future.” (Gautam Chikermane –ORF). Do you agree?
I emphatically agree. There are people in both countries, Americans and Indians both, who cling to past perceptions. Yet, despite any sort of virtue signaling that democratic political leaders feel obliged to engage in to mollify even small constituent groups; they tend to be focused on the practical realities of how to support their nations and secure the best life circumstances possible for their citizens. And those decisions are made based on current realities and geopolitical dynamics. Americans embraced Germany and Japan as key allies not more than a decade after they were implacable enemies. Look, too, at the warm relations between Washington and Hanoi, which led the fight against the United States in Vietnam.
Today, it would be difficult to find Americans whose perceptions of India derive from the latter’s historical relationship with Russia and its closeness with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Americans in general have very warm feelings toward India. At the conclusion of the September 28, 2014, speech by new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New York’s Madison Square Garden, a highly influential and knowledgeable US lawmaker in attendance reached out to me because I knew Modi. He was excited about the new Prime Minister and the prospect of resetting US-India relations; other lawmakers happily anticipated warming relations with India. In another sign of how the American public really feel about India and Modi in October 2023, the junior Senator from the State of Wisconsin introduced a resolution that condemned India for what it alleged was India’s “persecution of…religious minorities and human rights defenders.” The resolution, which if passed only expresses a Senate opinion and does not have the force of law, has failed to gain a single co-sponsor among the other 99 Senators. Moreover, a secondary goal of the resolution’s supporters is to force public hearings on the matter in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to which the resolution was referred. Yet, the Senators on the committee have no appetite for this. The bill will languish there until the Senate adjourns for good later this year, when the resolution will die. This would not have happened if the Senators did not see a groundswell of popular support for the nation and people of India and a general rejection of the allegations that the failed resolution repeats.
Another factor that is significant in binding the two countries is the fact that with each passing year, more and more Americans are of Indian descent or origin. Around the time that the modern state of India was born, the Indian-American population was perhaps as low as 1,500. Like other groups, Indians faced restrictive immigration laws and from some corners hostility. But things have changed dramatically since then, for Indian and non-Indian-Americans. When the United States government conducted its decennial census in 1990, there already were 815,477 people of Indian descent in the United States. By 2000, that number more than doubled to 1,678,675 or 0.6 percent of the entire population. By the next census in 2010, it had risen by about 70 percent to 2,843,391, or just under a tenth of the country. The most recent census (2020) shows Indian-Americans to be the most populous “Asian Alone population group,” for the first time surpassing Chinese Americans, numbering 4,460,000, or about 1.3 percent of the total population. While these numbers do not separate India Americans by religion, we can talk about the growing number of US Hindus, since most people associate Hinduism with India in one way or another. In 2017, the Pew Research Forum on Religion and Public Life estimated that there were about 1.7 million Hindus in the United States, making them the world’s seventh largest Hindu population. Since then, immigration from India, resettlement of persecuted Hindus from Bhutan, Afghanistan, and other South Asian countries in particular has fueled a steady increase in the US Hindu population. As a result, Pew projects that by mid-century, the United States will have the world’s fifth largest Hindu population, more than Sri Lanka and less than only India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. And as with other immigrant populations to the United States for both Indians generally and Hindus, each succeeding generation is more and more assimilated; that is, becoming Americans without forgetting their heritage or faith. (My own experience with the Indian-American and Jewish communities in schools and otherwise confirms this.) Today, a growing number of our friends and neighbors come from India and are becoming ever more important in the United States society and economy. Attitudes have changed, and most Americans see their Indian-American allies as important partners in building an even stronger United States.
More than just their numbers, Indian-Americans are the most successful national ethnic group in the United States. According to the US Census, Indian-Americans had the highest median annual household income of any national group, $151,141; well more than twice the national figure of $69,717. Indian Americans are also the CEOs of far more major US corporations than their population would suggest. Depending on the criteria used by different ranking systems, the number is somewhere between 30 and 50, and includes such tech giants as Microsoft and IBM, and Twitter prior to its purchase by Elan Musk. The influence of Indian-Americans extends beyond the tech industry, which most Americans associate with Indian-Americans due to their ground breaking dominance in the field. They also are the heads of the grocery and food giant Albertsons, the ubiquitous Starbuck’s, and previously, the financial company, Mastercard; just to name a few. In effect, this means that some of the most impactful decisions for Americans are made by their fellow citizens who either immigrated to the US from India or whose parents did.
The rise of many Indian-Americans in American government and politics also indicates how different today is from that past to which Gautam Chikermane’s quote refers. Before 2013, there was not a single Indian-American in the 435 member US House of Representatives (a body much like India’s Lok Sabha or the UK’s House of Commons). As of the last election, there were five, which roughly equals the proportion of Indian-Americans in the total population. This year, however, has seen a veritable explosion of Indian-American candidates, with the five incumbent House members all running for re-election and expected to win handily. Eleven other Indian-American from both major parties also are running for Congress. Though about half of them have little or no chance of prevailing, the 2024 election could see a US House with Indian-Americans Members that far outnumber their proportion of the population. This election season also saw two Indian-Americans compete for their party’s Presidential nomination for the first time (Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy). Vice President Kamala Harris also will be on the ballot running for re-election to the second highest elective office in the land. As someone who works extensively in the political arena, I also can say authoritatively that Indian-Americans are rapidly filling state, local, and administrative offices throughout the United States; and they represent the next generation who will occupy higher offices in the future. In order words, there is far more Indian cultural (or civilizational) input into American government, and the American public is getting used to seeing Indian-Americans just as they see other Americans compete for political office.
With the end of the Cold War now more than 30 years in the past, fewer and fewer Americans associate India with the close relations it maintained with the Soviet Union. I would guess fewer Indians associate the US with the close relations it used to have with Pakistan, or things like the 1984 Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal that exposed over half a million people to the highly toxic gas, methyl isocyanate and is still considered to be the world’s worst industrial accident. To be sure, both countries are democracies, which means their citizens are not forced to march in lock step with the majorities, and there are elements in both countries that dislike the other; for instance, those Americans who mistakenly believe that India’s religious minorities are persecuted, and those Indians who mistakenly believe that the United States seeks to dominate the rest of the world, or (as at least one highly placed Indian alleged to me) that the US government is controlled by a church determined to make Christianity India’s majority religion.. But they remain minority positions in both countries. India and the United States are different countries than they were before 2013, populated with decision-makers who have no political or strategic referent from the decades before that.
3. Do you believe that Putin's acceleration closer to China makes India-Russia going down from being a very high-value strategic partnership to a transactional one?
The question is a good one because it identifies the factor behind the most serious shift driving why Indian-Russian interaction had to change. It also puts its finger on a long term geopolitical dynamic that is shaping the decisions made in most capitals today, New Delhi being no exception. As noted above, Russia is one of the leading exponents of authoritarianism, while India is a leader among democracies in today’s defining geopolitical struggle. This gulf places India and Russia on opposite sides of strategic decisions more often than not. As the question suggests, Russia has moved closer to China in a coalition that prioritizes state control over the people’s rule. At the same time, fewer nations want to be associated with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 4, 2022. Hence, a vibrant India pursuing its own interests in specific situations, such as the purchase of Russian energy despite US objections. On the other hand, India will make a much wider array of decisions that align it with the United States often against Russian interests (e.g., India’s prominent participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad; and closer military alignment with the United States, especially as regards long term strategy for Asia). The former is “transactional,” based on immediate and discrete interests; the latter is “strategic,” based on an overall understanding of ultimate aims.
Don’t expect Indian-Russian relations to go into the deep freeze any time soon, however. It is a testimony to the good feelings many Indians still have toward Russia after decades of close friendship. While they have not turned sour, however, they have frayed. Russia (or the USSR) used to be India’s major arms supplier, but not anymore. Between 2010 and 2019, military imports from Russia never accounted for less than half of all military imports, reaching a high of 86 percent in 2012. In 2020, for the first time, Russia was not the largest source of arms imports. France was, and Russia’s share dropped to 35 percent. Although India takes a lot of heat for its ongoing imports of Russian oil and gas, new major military trading partners and a growing domestic defense industry have taken a large bite out of a major source of Russian income. The geopolitical dynamics that created the once very close relationship between India and Russia have changed dramatically. The number of Indians who recall their nation’s relationship with Russia fondly represent a declining proportion of the population, and the importance of good strategic decisions today further attenuates positive India-Russia relations. If any modicum of the previous closeness survives, it will require a total rethinking and restructuring.
Under the old dynamic, the USSR was definitely the “big brother,” with India being the junior partner in the alliance. Today, those roles would be reversed. Russia is a declining power that is fighting its own demographic reality. India is a rising power whose demographics support its continued rise. On August 29, 2019, Putin declared, “Every 25-27 years, a significantly lower number of Russians enter adulthood” and thereby childbearing years; and this phenomenon reflects Russia’s looming demographic disaster. At the start of the 20th century, Russia was the fourth most populous nation or national entity in the world, behind China, British India, and the United States. Throughout the twentieth century, however, it experienced one demographic disaster after another. The first part of the century saw mass out-migration, World War I, the Russian Revolution, and subsequent Civil War. Their combined impact caused the first major dip in the Russian demographic curve (or population pyramid). Nothing, however, could have prepared Russia for World War II. By most estimates, the Soviet Union suffered around 27,000,000 deaths, or 13.7 percent of its total population. For perspective, Germany lost 5.7 million or 8.23 percent, Japan under 4 million (less than four percent), the US and the UK less than 400,000 (0.32 percent and 0.94 percent respectively). With Russians comprising the bulk of those losses, they took a downward slope into a death spiral that has only gotten worse. These events, moreover, had a devastating effect on the population of childbearing males, resulting in significant portions of Russia’s already challenged demographic curve showing larges excesses of marriage age females with no Russian mates. That contributed to significant out-migration of Russian women, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union and another disastrous war in Ukraine. They now will bear children who will be Americans or some other nationality, but not Russian. By 2000, Russia had fallen to sixth place by population and its fall accelerated, dropping it to ninth after less than quarter century.
With the demographic challenges cyclical and exacerbated by bad decisions, the fall will continue, and Russia is projected to lose over 27 percent of its 2024 population by the end of this century dropping to the nineteenth or twentieth most populous country. This fall represents more than something retrenchment or restructuring can fix. Declining populations mean that countries lack sufficient numbers to power their economies or fill the ranks of their militaries. We already are seeing clear signs of the latter in the form of increased Ukraine War conscription from non-Russian populations. Should they balk or successfully resist this, the Russian military will be in deep trouble, even deeper than it is already.
Russia’s dismal battlefield performance in Ukraine has exposed its presumed military edge as a chimera. In addition to huge net losses in almost every category of military hardware, despite a wartime economy that is producing at ten times the rate it was before Ukraine; it has suffered an estimated 300,000 casualties with no end in sight. We’re also starting to see rumblings of an independence movement in Siberia, which represents about 78 percent of Russia’s total area, including its access to the Pacific Ocean, the world’s largest hydrocarbon basis, enormous gas fields, and massive amounts of gold and diamonds. Historically, democratic countries with multi-national populations, like India and the United States, bind peoples together in positive ways and do not face secessionist agitation; whereas authoritarian regimes like Russia do. I recall being in Northern Bengal, India, several years ago during a good deal of unrest in the Northeast. One of the protest voices was the Gorkha National Liberation Front. Though it argued for Gorkha independence, it called for a greater voice within India and West Bengal, not an independent state. Though we should not see a serious secession move by Siberia any time soon, current disaffection could hamper Russia’s conscription activities and is nonetheless another stressor on Russian independent action. And that makes continued dependence on the Chinese and the latter’s leading role in the coalition of authoritarianism ever stronger. This only increases the gulf between India and Russia and makes India’s decisions more and more at odds with those made in Moscow (and Beijing); especially as India and China vie to be the dominant power in Asia.
4. How do you look at the competitive nature between the two Asian giants, India and China?
This is arguably the most fascinating bilateral relationship on the globe, if not the most impactful (that being the United States and China). There are many people who believe this struggle will be the battle of the 21st century, but I disagree with them. While the competition itself is by no means over, and we can expect to see more battles, as well as stops and starts for at least a couple decades; its outcome seems already decided in India’s favor.
China’s demographics might be even more challenged than Russia’s. When India surpassed China as the world’s most populous country earlier this year, it was the first time in centuries that China did not hold that title. And China’s slide is getting worse. For the first time in memory, China’s actual population fell in 2023, and by mid-century, there will be about a third of a billion more Indians than Chinese. By 2100, less than 76 years from now, China’s population will be just over half what it is today. Consider for a moment what it would mean for your own country or any other if almost every other one of your compatriots disappeared. Towns would be depopulated and vanish; businesses would go bust for lack of customers; manufacturers would have to close their doors because there simply are not enough workers, even for partially robotic work forces. Worse still, your nation would face massive shortages in its military, of both average soldiers and sailors and well trained pilots and others needed for today’s high-tech military hardware. But China’s demographic spiral is not the result only of the 15- 20 million deaths during World War II and the Japanese occupation, the subsequent civil war, and the tens of millions who were sacrificed on the altar of communist social engineering; nor is it only a function of the one-child policy of Mao Zedong and his successors. It is all of them but more.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has instituted financial and other incentives for young people to have larger families, but very few people have taken him up on them. Both the United Nations Population Fund and the World Bank put China’s fertility rate at just 1.2 and India’s at the replacement rate of 2.1. The United States is below that replacement rate at 1.7, but the US continuously supplements its births with immigration, which is the reason why the United States is the only western democracy expected to increase in population throughout the 21st century. In contrast, how many people can we find who want to move to China, its lack of freedom through communist repression, and its lack of opportunity via its state managed economy? In fact, hard figures from those same organizations support that conclusion. In 2022 alone, China had a net migration number of minus 311,380; while the United States had a net migration of almost a million people (999,540), and that does not include the millions more who entered the United States illegally and do not appear in those figures. A great many young Chinese simply do not see much of a future in China, whether to bring children into that world or even to remain there themselves.
The phenomenon compounds existing problems. For many years, I have been saying that the Chinese economy is a “house of cards,” at the very least because it is dependent on many millions of buying decisions made by consumers who, for the most part, either dislike or are suspicious of the Chinese government. Since 2021, the United States has had a Select Committee in the House of Representatives with the sole purpose of identifying Chinese Communist Party threats to the American public; and it is having an impact. In 2022, China lost its position as the top country for US imports, and has since fallen to fourth. As one of those American consumers, I can tell you that I avoid purchasing Chinese products, as do most other Americans I know. This shift also is apparent in the greater number of affordable options from Europe and countries including Mexico, Canada, and increasingly India; which in the last quarter of 2022 ramped up its production of inexpensive electronics, an American market dominated by China for years. Another stressor on the Chinese economy’s ability to serve its people is the aging of Chinese society, especially compared to India. China’s median age of close to 40 is more than ten years higher than India’s, and the median age for Chinese women is older than the traditional top age for childbearing. This means that even if the economy was solid, the ever increasing bill for the elderly and their pensions, far exceeds the ability of the gainfully employed to support them; and China’s tortured population pyramid shows no end to this crisis in sight.
There are many more elements of China’s economy that have been failing as a result of these demographic pressures and bad decisions made by the state managed economy commissars. China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), launched with great fanfare in 2013, is failing. BRI’s legacy consists in large part of massive infrastructure projects laying abandoned, after forcing population dislocation and environmental disaster in countries from Europe to Southeast Asia; from Montenegro’s “road to nowhere” to Malaysia’s near empty “ghost city.” Countries that might have been able to repay the loans (also referred to as “debt trap diplomacy” because they are structured to force borrowing nations into concessions that would strengthen China’s grandiose geopolitical strategy) have been withdrawing from the program in droves, leaving only those nations too far in debt to leave or unable to secure alternate funding. At one point, China gave would be defaulting nations debt relief by seizing control of strategic assets, such as Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port; but it seems to lack the economic strength to continue doing so and fuel its domestic economy simultaneously. With billions of dollars in uncollectable debts, a 2023 article in Foreign Policy called BRI “a shadow of its former self.”
The demographic and economic challenges have hurt the Chinese military as well. Demographics and little desire to serve the Chinese Communist Party controlled military has resulted in major recruitment shortfalls for well-educated and technically proficient pilots needed to fly advanced aircraft, and for other positions that require technical skills. Many potential recruits have quit the country for others where their educations promise opportunities and dividends for them and their families. On top of that, there have been recent revelations of massive and systemic corruption in the Chinese military, including missiles filled with water where fuel is supposed to be. Xi has responded with major purges of Peoples Liberation Army generals and other officials including Defense Minister Li Shangfu. Many are coming to doubt China will have the power to invade Taiwan, as it has promised to do; and even China supporters admit that its window for doing so is closing. While all this has been happening, the Indian military has continued to grow and gain more advanced weapons systems from its own domestic arms industry and from advanced imports coming from the United States and Israel. China’s falling (or disappearing edge over India has taken several forms. In March 2024, Prime Minister Modi announced that he would be visiting the far northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh. This was significant since China claims the area for itself as part of southern Tibet. China objected strenuously to action it called provocative, but Modi simply ignored that, rather contemptuously; and when China “deplore[d]” the visit after Modi went there, Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, dismissed the Chinese objection and said that Arunachal Pradesh “was, is, and always be an integral and inalienable part of India.” But Modi did even more to stick his thumb in China’s eye. While there, he inaugurated the Sela Tunnel, which is the world’s largest bi-lane tunnel. The tunnel will further cement Arunachal Pradesh’s connectivity with the rest of India, something that previous Indian governments recognized as a red line for China. Modi also dedicated a new airport, further increasing the state’s ties with the rest of India and perhaps more importantly, dedicated the Kameng Hydro Electric Power Project. Arunachal Pradesh is a large territory with a small population, with massive amounts of hydroelectric power. This resource is one of the major reasons why China covets that part of India. But again, Modi ignored China’s likely anger, no doubt recognizing that it would not be able to turn that anger into actual actions. Finally, there are other boundary disputes between India and China in Ladokh and Sikkim, and China does not have the clout to stampede India out of its own territory; and this gives India more power to help neighboring Nepal and Bhutan resist Chinese encroachments on their tiny territories.
China in all likelihood retains enough power to stop Indian actions that truly endanger their perceived sovereignty and power, but time is not on its side.
5. Has India’s Neighbourhood Policy undergone change during 2014-2024?
In an NDTV interview, Indian Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, talked about India’s Neighbourhood Policy this way: “As the biggest country of the neighborhood, as the largest economy, we are happy to work with you so that together the entire neighborhood can be more secure and more prosperous.” Now what that means in practice has changed dramatically since Narendra Modi in an unprecedented move invited the leaders of all his neighbors to attend his first swearing in ceremony as India’s Prime Minister. The overwhelming reason for that change is the growing intensity in the India-China competition, including the many inroads China has made among India’s neighbors. Perhaps underscoring India’s global aspirations, in that same interview, Jaishankar also talked about what India sees just beyond its “immediate neighborhood.” He talked about expanding that immediate circle in all directions; specifically mentioning Israel to the West, Central Asia to the North; and Act East with no limitations noted. None of that does anything to ease Chinese and Russian ill ease.
Whether India has maintained good or bad relations with each of its neighbors, Chinese involvement can be found in all of them. As a result, Pakistan is almost a Chinese vassal; Sri Lanka is not far behind but struggling against that; Maldives is bouncing back and forth between pro-China and anti-China leaders; Nepal and Bhutan are being bullied by China into unfair border dispute resolutions; and Bangladesh is moving, albeit more cautiously than others, toward China, but seems to be managing the competitors’ claims better than most. In Afghanistan, US and NATO troops are gone, and an Islamist Taliban government is providing a safe haven for ISIS and other terror groups hostile toward India. One would expect these new realities to cause India to reassess how it prioritizes its geopolitical strategy and actions; that is, Indian policy for these nations, like others, must now be strategic in keeping with India’s new global status.
India’s Neighbourhood Policy has not changed to the extent that Indian foreign policy makers still recognize that they must insure a measure of stability and perhaps even solidarity in its neighborhood in order to pursue its global interests. And that makes good sense. It certainly is something that Europeans pursued and achieved post World War II and again with their nations to the east after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Early in its history, the United States emphasized this policy with the Monroe Doctrine, and with the exceptions of Cuba and Venezuela at the moment, the US has achieved it. The policy also helps explain (but not justify) Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and his obsession with building something akin to the old Soviet constellation and its buffer states. Like Russia, China is challenged in its relations with neighbors. It has been successful in winning back Hong Kong and Macao and tying Russia closer to it. It has not seen the same success with ASEAN nations, which remain tactical adversaries, or in subjugating Taiwan. These are challenges that every global power must include in their calculations. How might this play out in India’s neighborhood?
The biggest change for India has been its strategy regarding Pakistan. While Islamabad cannot be ignored, it is not the major calculation it was for previous Indian governments. In 2022, former Indian Ambassador to the United States Nirupama Rao told the United States Institute of Peace, “South Asia is a different place today with China’s assertive military and financial clout generating challenges for India’s neighborhood policy. Our relationship with Pakistan will continue to remain fraught and weighted down by cross-border ‘gray zone’ confrontation and militancy targeted against us. Of even more consequence is the hostile and adversarial state of India’s relations with China.” Even as more and more BRI projects fail, more nations withdraw from the program, and China’s ability to both fund it and explain away predatory lending seizures; it continues to pour millions into Pakistan and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); $62 billion as of August 2023. Beset with Pakistan’s seemingly eternal political turmoil, corruption, and national/ethnic conflicts; CPEC has (most generously) not live up to expectations and is in danger or (according to many) failed already. China has a lot invested in CPEC and Pakistan, and it has strategic interests there, as well. With US-Pakistan relations in a deteriorated state, China has been solidifying Pakistan’s dependence on it. Additionally, CPEC gives China access to and control over Pakistan’s (more specifically Balochistan’s) warm water Gwadar Port, which secures Mideast oil imports and would speed up troop deployment to several areas. China will strive to protect its interests in Pakistan which makes one of its border disputes with India more of a priority. China claims it as Aksai Chin, part of Tibet. India claims it as part of Ladokh. Complicating matters, Pakistan has ceded some nearby territory to China, and together, China’s connecting road with Pakistan and its ability to protect CPEC run through those lands. Include the history of Pakistani supported terror groups and the Kashmir conflict seemingly without end, and it appears highly remote, if not impossible, for these two nuclear powers to cooperate as good neighbors.
On the other hand, India is Sri Lanka’s best hope. Sri Lanka did not fully emerge from its devastating civil war until 2009, and even before then started taking large loans from China’s Exim Bank under BRI. When it could not repay them, China offered debt relief, but at a high price: control of Sri Lanka’s strategic Hambantota Port; and even at that, the relief was modest and only temporary. Since then, Sri Lanka’s economy has cratered further, and the country has been trying to cobble together non-predatory loans from other sources. In 2023, it secured a $3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund and subsequently a $1 billion line of credit from India. Although Sri Lanka still faces tremendous challenges, India can continue to help it get out from under its debt to the Chinese. Additionally, part of India’s Neighbourhood Policy is its role as a first responder in times of crisis. In this way, it can help Sri Lanka rebuild its infrastructure, based on potential for income production as most loans are, without taking on more Chinese debt that seems structured to avoid income producing projects. India also made an important strategic decision by not embracing the Tamil Tigers after the Sri Lankan civil war, despite its own 69 million strong Tamil population, most in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu; in that way, not burning bridges with the island nation’s government. India can play the same neighborly role with Maldives. It has not been shy in supporting former President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, who was voted out in favor of current President Mohamed Muizzu who has been pro-Chinese. Yet, Modi called Muizzi to congratulate him on his victory and has maintained good relations with him. Maldives, like Sri Lanka, is looking at default on Chinese debt. India can help there, too, and also can encourage Indian tourism to Maldives (which is one of the most beautiful places on earth), to help build its economy. Not incidentally, control over Maldives by China could scuttle Indian freedom to navigate through a critical waterway.
Afghanistan presents a different set of issues. It would have been easy for India to join with other democratic nations and cut ties with the new Taliban government. It did not, and that turned out to be a smart decision. I don’t think this decision was strategic so much as in keeping with long held Indian values of recognizing each country’s right to determine its own internal policies. Because I work with a lot of Afghans, I’m familiar with the complexities of relations in the area. India provides a bridge between the Taliban and the community of nations. If it has any chance of moderating and joining those countries, India might be Afghanistan’s best chance of navigating that course. As a first step, I understand that Afghanistan is anxious to rejoin cricket games in the region. It’s a start. Afghanistan also offers something significant for India. Even before the US withdrawal, large mineral deposits had been discovered in Afghanistan, many with strategic implications. China has been quite active in this sector, but India can play a role in which it not only gains the advantages of mineral wealth and favorable trade for itself and the side of democracy. It also can help reduce China’s influence in the area, while enhancing its own “good neighbor” status.
Nepal and Bhutan both present yet another set of challenges. Both countries are being pressured by China to endorse one-sided agreements that would force these two tiny countries to cede territory to China. It is also significant that the third border dispute between China and India (Sikkim and the top of the Siliguri Corridor or Chicken’s Neck) lies right between these two Himalayan nations. Bhutan is 136th in size among nations (Nepal is a little better at 95th), and China is 4th. So it should come as no surprise that these disputes are not about “colonialism” as China claims, but geopolitical strategy. The China-Bhutan border dispute goes back decades, but in 2020, China ipso facto added another 740 square kilometers to its claim. The reason is that the additional territory includes the Doklam Plateau, which overlooks the Siliguri Corridor, and Chinese control of it gives them a base for intelligence gathering on Indian troops in the region. This strip of land is also the strategic lifeline that connects parts of India’s northeast with the rest of the country, and so control of Doklam enables China to thwart India sending troops to defend its far flung regions. Additionally, the surrounding peaks control the water flow into Tibet, and its control gives India a strategic advantage. For its part, Bhutan (which after all is the sovereign nation whose land is at risk of seizure) has, through its Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, said that Bhutan, China, and India all have an equal say in settling the dispute. That’s important because it matches Indian statements about any settlement. India should use that to further its good neighbor ties with Bhutan. Its presence can insure that Bhutan will not be bullied by a much stronger power because it has another—India—on its side. India could strengthen its position by adopting positions that support Bhutanese sovereignty over the area, perhaps even using the Sikkim Siliguri Corridor to enhance Bhutan’s security; in exchange, perhaps for a long term lease, such as the United States previously had with Panama for the Panama Canal. There is a lot of room for mutual benefits. Last year, India even sent troops to the region to stop China after it did the same. The Indian gambit worked and China backed down. Since then, however, China has been building roads and other infrastructure on what it claims as its territory, and India has not yet responded. Can it show its strength as Bhutan’s big brother? Nepal presents a different problem. In 2021, China constructed buildings in Nepal’s Humla District, claiming the territory as its own. The problem is that Nepal can’t seem to keep a coherent government for any significant time. The Diplomat had a 2016 article on “Nepal’s Unending Political Instability,” and nothing has changed that since. Worse still, as soon as they take control, Nepal’s power grabbers start out by abandoning whatever the previous government had in place. This has left Nepal with varying, often conflicting, and disorganized foreign policies. The latest Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal survived an attempted ouster less than a year after taking power, and a little more than a year after that, he dumped all his coalition partners and formed a new government with others. So the path for India is not clear; but because Nepal also claims a piece of Indian territory, perhaps the Indian government can help Nepal secure justice in exchange for relinquishing some or all of its claims to Indian territory. Depending on which party is in power, however, the Nepalese government might actually favor closer relations with China and distance itself from India. In that case, India’s most prudent course might be to put its actions on hold until the inevitable change in Nepal brings a more favorable government to power.
Bangladesh is in a different situation than any of India’s other neighbors.
It has experienced something of an economic miracle over the past decade, which is not stopping. While many Bangladeshis privately criticize Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for creating a “one party democracy,” she has been in office for over 15 years and is expected to cruise to another victory later this year. She has brought political stability in leadership to a country once riddled with coups and military takeovers. This has allowed her to focus on Bangladeshi development and interests, while maneuvering deftly between conflicting giants like China and the United States. It also has enabled her to develop a strong relationship with Narendra Modi, who took office five years after she did and also will win another term easily this year. One of the phrases I keep hearing in India is “Bangladesh is not Pakistan.” People stress that Bangladesh is a nation with which India can cooperate and build things, while Pakistan is not. Most Indians also express genuine warm feelings for Bangladeshis. There is a distinct absence of people emphasizing former conflicts that used to be highlighted: water rights, illegal migration, mutual accusations of persecuting the other’s major religious group, harboring terrorists who attack the other, and so forth. India has crafted a mutually beneficial policy with Bangladesh that highlights both countries as good neighbors and nations on the rise. Whatever India is doing to pursue its Neighborhood Policy with Bangladesh, keep doing it!
Full disclosure: I for a long time have been a friend of India, a frequent visitor, and voracious in my pursuit of information and insight on Bharat. For many years, I labored tirelessly to stop the ethnic cleansing of Hindus in Bangladesh, and I did so with no support (sometimes opposition) from the Congress Party led UPA government in New Delhi. Narendra Modi was very gracious to me, taking time with me when he was Gujarat’s Chief Minister, and offering his strength and support. As Prime Minister, he has had to pursue a more nuanced foreign policy but has nonetheless taken several steps that have supported several of my actions. So, do I have personal beliefs and positions? Of course. Have they in some way informed my answers? I don’t know, but I strive always to maintain objectivity and give my readers the best analysis I can regardless.
Mediation: Solving Bangladesh’s Property Dispute Backlogs
https://dailyasianage.com/news/320217/mediation-solving-bangladeshs-property-dispute-backlogs
By. Dr. Richard L. Benkin, International Ambassador, Bangladesh International Mediation Society
In 2023, I sat with police officials just outside a major Bangladeshi city in the hopes of resolving a serious property dispute. An associate of mine had come to me on behalf of a relative whose business had been seized by two former employees. The business had been successful, successful enough that the owner decided to open a second location. While the initial location was stable, the new one needed continuous management and oversight to make sure it provided customers with the same level of quality and service as the first. So, the owner asked two employees to manage the first location while he devoted his time to bringing the new place up to standards. This is not unusual and is rather standard business practice globally.
But this common business practice soon ran into trouble when the two employees announced that they had taken possession of the business and prevented its legitimate owner from entering the premises. The owner tried to talk to them and resolve the matter, but they rebuffed him no matter what he proposed. Only after that did he go to my associate who came to me for help; which is why we were meeting with police officials. My associate’s relative simply wanted a just resolution to the matter so he could go on with his life and business operations. It also must be said that the police officials, and everyone we met at the station, were gracious, knowledgeable, and they tried to help. Unfortunately, however, the police can do only so much when the law or its implementation hinders effective resolution.
The police official was sympathetic and acknowledged that the problem existed for any lawful owner whose property had been illicitly seized; but again suggested we convince the two parties to resolve the matter. I pointed out, however, that I had been involved in countless negotiations over the years, and it was clear that the miscreants had zero incentive to negotiate. As things stood, they were able to seize the property and maintain control over it unmolested. Meanwhile, they enjoyed its fruits and neither the police nor the rightful owner could do anything about it. Why in the world, I asked, would they have any reason to compromise their advantaged position and negotiate with their former employer? The police official could but smile and nod.
All of us seemed frustrated, so I asked the official if there were other legal means available to the rightful owner, and he said we could go through the courts. But when I asked how long that process takes, he replied, “twenty or thirty years.” Well, that tore it. “If ever the phrase ‘justice delayed is denied’ applied anywhere, it’s here, I said. “These miscreants are in complete possession of the business and its assets, which they can use as they please; while my friend can’t even enter the premises that he built up through his own hard work and personal investment. By the time the courts rule—even if in my friend’s favor—the miscreants would have had the benefits and profits of 20 years or more and could strip the business of any valuable or useful assets before they turn over a mere shell of it.” But, as is so often the case, the problem itself suggested its solution; and that solution is mediation or alternative dispute resolution.
The Bangladeshi legal system, like those in the United States or anywhere throughout the world, has any number of serious priorities that it has to handle on a daily basis: crimes that impact the people’s safety and quality of life; national security matters; official conduct and the maintenance of law and order. Yet, as is also the case globally, the system is clogged with large numbers of backlogged cases, most having to do with matters tangential at best to those critical issues facing both lay people and legal professionals. In Bangladesh, one of those case areas is property disputes, most often hard property like someone’s home, or property like my friend’s business. These are serious legal matters that often leave people homeless or nullify the benefits of a citizen’s hard work and initiative; but these are backlogs caused in part by a peculiarity of Bangladeshi law that thwarts the operation of justice.
I have been involved with many legal systems globally and have yet to find one that allows someone to commit a crime—such as this illegal seizure of assets, or violent home invasion—and even rewards them for it; except for Bangladesh, that is. This sort of illegal seizure characterizes a lot of cases I have been involved with in Bangladesh, most of which see people being evicted violently from their homes. In fact, just days before the police meetings above, I was involved with a case in the Rajshahi District in which people were forcibly thrown out of their home without any legal means to avoid being homeless. The police official with whom we met recognized the victim’s plight but could not recover his family home. The government official responsible for land disputes in the area responded similarly. I thanked them for their sympathy but said that it did not solve my friend and his family’s homelessness.
In jurisdictions throughout the world, if someone wants to challenge someone’s lawful right to a property, the government provides a legal process by which that can be done. The people and government show their faith in the legal system and its ability to administer justice by adhering to the legal requirements for challenging and adjudicating lawful property rights. No matter how strongly challengers feel their cases are, they do not press it by seizing the property in question and with sufficient violence evicting the current owner. If they do, they become the lawbreakers and are subject to arrest for their crimes. Unfortunately, those extrajudicial and violent property seizures without any legal consequence occur regularly in Bangladesh. Perhaps the land grabbers have reason to believe that the law will protect them or at least not challenge their criminal action, or their extralegal possession of the property in question. Or perhaps they are frustrated by the fact that the legal system will, as that police official told me, take a full generation to resolve their claim. Whichever it is, it is a problem; but a problem with a solution that legal professionals worldwide are using more and more frequently: alternative dispute resolution.
Over many years, I have been part of efforts that resolved dozens, if not hundreds, of complex and high dollar cases through mediation. There were times when we worked through and resolved dozens of cases in a single morning. Most of these cases had been laying open for years, leaving both plaintiff and defendant in a legal netherworld that thwarted their ability to move on in their lives and operations. Companies suffered millions of dollars in losses, and stock prices were negatively impacted by millions more in unknown liabilities. Individuals were prevented from pursuing their professional development and continued to depend on assistance to pay for their medical services and basic needs. Meanwhile, the situation contributed to rising medical costs and increased, long term use of opioids. If mediation was able to resolve these problems, it has the ability to help Bangladesh resolve this one; and in doing so, let the parties move on under the auspices of legal action, increase pubic confidence in the legal system, reduce violence and extrajudicial evictions; and ends a system by which the law, even if inadvertently, enables and ratifies lawbreaking.
Moving property disputes to compulsory mediation also removes them from the same basket as crime and national security, thereby letting the system focus on those priorities. It is emblematic of an advanced nation that rests on the rule of law. Exactly how to accomplish this is best left to legal minds here in Bangladesh who are far more knowledgeable than I am; especially my colleagues in the Bangladesh International Mediation Society. They already are accomplished at alternate dispute resolution and are training more and more attorneys in this skill.
Putting an end to this legal anomaly for property disputes—most likely a vestige of pre-1971 practice—will be another step in lifting the people and nation of Bangladesh, all under the stewardship of this Bangladeshi government and its leader, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
Dr. Richard L. Benkin is an American scholar and geopolitical analyst.
Bangladesh Elections 2024
What drove Senator Baldwin’s anti-India resolution, and what can we do about it
7 min read
By: Dr. Richard L. Benkin
On October 24, Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), introduced Senate Resolution 424, which is anti-India, based on misinformation and disinformation, and treats one of our greatest allies as a second rate power. The resolution calls on the United States (US) government to “engage” the Indian government “to end persecution of, and violence against religious minorities and human rights defenders in India and a reversal of government policies that discriminate against Muslims and Christians on the basis of their respective faiths.” It was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations where it remains—and where it must die.
There are a lot of things wrong with the resolution, but its fatal flaw is its assumption without critical evaluation that this Indian government actively discriminates against religious minorities and provides impunity for individuals who do so. Because minorities unfortunately face discrimination pretty much everywhere. Resolution 424 charges India with being far worse by asserting that such discrimination is government policy. It also singles out India in a way that usually is reserved for Israel, while holding favored nations harmless. For instance, it calls out the state of Karnataka for banning the hijab in schools and colleges but never seemed concerned when France did the same; nor when several European states banned kosher slaughtering of food animals. Nor did it object to the reams of US case law in which courts ruled that public safety and law have precedence over parochial religious desires that put them both in jeopardy. One set of standards for white Europeans and another for non-white Asians was the basis for centuries of European imperialism and colonization. Baldwin might not be trying to revive the British Raj, but her actions do so anyway.
Having said that, I have no reason to not think that Senator Baldwin herself is a bigot. I don’t know her or what her personal biases might or might not be; but I do know the US Senate and a lot of current and former Senators. Most have expertise in one or another area, however, they are asked to take positions on a range of topics, foreign and domestic. Only in very rare cases do we find one who knows most of them; especially where foreign policy and global matters are concerned. The sheer volume of issues can be overwhelming; plus, constituents, staff, and supporters often come to them believing their issue should take precedence over everything else. So, Capitol Hill lawmakers depend on their staff and constituents to research, verify, and provide them with good insight and information on whatever particular issue is before them. It’s even more complicated when the subject is India or South Asia because of its distance from the United States. As such, few Americans go there, unless they have South Asian heritage themselves. Cultural, linguistic, and other differences between West and East also militates against serious understanding. Add to that the fact that many people, by default, have a notion that India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is “Hindu nationalist,” and somehow that is not good for Muslims and Christians. I know that’s not the case, but I do spend a lot of time in India so I know better. I’m talking about people’s perceptions when all they hear comes from one, politically interested, side.
That means two things for us. First, it would be a mistake to dismiss Senator Baldwin as irredeemable and assume that she never will see things fairly. Second, it is our responsibility to inform lawmakers. If all they hear comes from those who have an agenda to harm India and especially Prime Minister Modi, what should make them think that there’s another side to the story? That’s where a truly grassroots effort can have an impact on what happens to Senate Resolution 424.
In actuality, there is little chance that this resolution will pass the entire Senate, but this is not the goal of those who cajoled Baldwin into proposing it. If they can get it heard in Senate hearings, where their political operatives can get a whole bunch of anti-India misinformation on the record, they win because few people will go to the trouble and fact check their allegations. The bias and misinformation will be out there as something “everyone knows.” Stopping that requires anyone who cares about this to contact their US Senators. For instance, if you live in Illinois, as I do, you would want to contact the offices of Senators Dick Durbin and Tammy Duckworth. If one of your Senators is on the Foreign Relations Committee (as Duckworth is), it is even more important that he or she gets this important information. If you live in Maryland, contacting Senator Ben Cardin is critical because he chairs the Committee. Virginia and Tennessee residents want to contact Senators Tim Kaine and Bill Hagerty respectively because the resolution’s advocates are trying to convince them to co-sponsor it. Kaine is a Democrat and Hagerty is a Republican; and the resolution will need co-sponsors who are on the Committee, one from each party. If we stop that, we stop the resolution.
Besides killing a very bad and bigoted resolution, your action also helps your Senators who depend on getting good information from their constituents.
Calls are better than emails or faxes, and the call can be as simple as registering that you are a constituent of the Senator and strongly opposed to Senate Resolution 424, introduced by Senator Tammy Baldwin and referred to the Foreign Relations Committee; and you urge the Senator in the strongest possible terms to reject this bigoted resolution and make sure the Senate rejects it, too. Or you can add something about how it offends you, or that it is based on false information. You can cite the unequal treatment it accords to India vs. other nations as evidenced by the example I gave earlier regarding the hijab ban. Or that it leans heavily on recommendations from USCIRF—recommendations that the State Department rejected. You also might refer to the highly authoritative Pew Research Center, which studied this and found that about nine in ten Indian Muslims and Indian Christians said they were perfectly free to practice their faiths. And certainly, Wisconsin residents should contact Senator Baldwin’s office.
If you need information to call your Senators, you can get information here: https://www.senate.gov/senators/senators-contact.htm
If you want to know who is on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that information is here: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/about/membership.
Several years ago, I was told by former Vice President and then Indiana Congressman Mike Pence that any Member of Congress who gets five or more calls from constituents about any piece of legislation will take notice and take action. They are that sensitive to what the voters say, especially if, like Senator Kaine, they are up for re-election.
The opposite is true, as well. If they do not hear from you, they might have no reason to question all those who are telling them otherwise. Take advantage of your rights as a member of this democratic republic. The choice to stand up for them or not is yours.
Interview with Dr. Richard Benkin on Terrorism
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3K0YyuqpCD0
While in India, Analyst Amitabh Tripathi interviewed me for his YouTube channel. We planned to focus on the terror against Israel but ended up talking about terrorism everywhere and the differential reactions we have to events in South Asia and the West.
How Can Bangladesh Maximize its People's Benefit?
Dr. Richard Benkin
Originally published in the Daily Asian Age of Dhaka. It is the second part of a two-part article about negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with strong US involvement, that would normalize relations between the two countries and again change the way people understand the Middle East conflicts. It is written to address the people of Bangladesh, whose population is 92 percent Muslim, and whose leaders can use this moment to advance the interests of their people and re-join the democratic alliance against tyranny.
https://dailyasianage.com/news/311829/how-can-bangladesh-maximize-its-peoples-benefit
In 1978, I was teaching at a university in Chicago. One evening after finishing my day, I got on the subway train to return home; all quite routine. But what followed was not routine. One of my students followed me onto the train and sat down next to me. I liked when that sort of thing happened because my students represented such a wide range of cultures, faiths, and nations. It was—and still is—important to me that I know and understand as many different peoples as possible; and that I saw all of us as one family. The young man had come to the United States from a village in Gambia. He was rather agitated and wanted to talk to me. He told me that during the 1960s and 1970s, he and his village experienced a period of tremendous prosperity and development during that time from a contingent of Israelis who were there to teach new farming methods, help with medical treatment, and so forth. They were there as part of their government’s commitment to the people of Africa that could be seen throughout the continent and in the smiling faces of the people. Moreover, he said, they and the villagers developed strong relations that helped the Israelis adapt their technology to the real needs of the people. That all changed, he said, in October 1973, when the Gabon government cut off relations with Israel and sent the doctors, technicians, and others home.
No one like it, not even the government that took this step. Africans as a whole maintained strong relations with Israel despite Arab pressure to cut their ties with the Jewish State. Israelis then and still today have strong feelings about Africa and their ability and obligation to help its people. By the 1973 Yom Kippur War (when Egypt and Syria launched surprise attacks on Israel on the holiest day of the Jewish year), African nations were cajoled, bribed, and told to break relations with Israel in the name of “continental unity.” According to my student, this political act was a severe blow to the well-being of the village and others like it. Without the Israelis, crops produced less food, if they produced any at all. Small businesses died out and even were prevented from selling to the Israel market, which also cost them. Conditions in the villages became difficult, and many young people, including my student left for what they hoped would be opportunities elsewhere. And my student’s experience stuck with me: the elites in the capital made a political decision that benefitted them personally without regard to the devastating affects it would have on the rest of the population. And that’s what happens if leaders believe they have to take certain actions because of things like faith. They will put the interests of others ahead of those of the people they are pledged to serve.
Forty-seven years later, we can be confident that leaders of Muslim-majority nations no longer have to subordinate their people’s well-being to others thousands of miles away who refuse to accept the sovereignty in whose name these sacrifices are demanded. The US brokered Abraham Accords effectively decoupled religion from what is a geopolitical conflict in the Middle East.; and in doing so cleared the way for a host of nations to drop their forced antipathy toward Israel and take actions to help their own people. You don’t have to take my word for it either. The evidence is all around us. In the past, anti-Israel activists regularly would try to manipulate support for their actions and to activate others’ emotions tying their own political interests to supposed religious dicta for all Muslims. But it no longer works. During conflicts in 2021 and 2022, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Iran, and other actors tried to compel support for Islamist and Palestinian attacks by going reflexively to their false claims that “Al Aqsa is at risk,” and the only way to save it is to eradicate Israeli authority over the mosque and Jerusalem. Their bigoted screeds fell on deaf ears, and Iran might have been the only Muslim-majority nation to ape those cries. Most Muslims refused to be fooled. They did not allow these radical forces to drag them back to a previous era from which they now have evolved. And they were not going to subordinate their people’s well-being to that of radical rejectionists. The world had moved on, and it was high time that Palestinian leadership allowed their people to move into the 21st century.
Two months after the Abraham Accords were signed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the Saudi city of Neom on the Red Sea. It was an historic moment, and the first time an Israeli Prime Minister set foot on Saudi soil; though Saudi spokesmen still had to deny it occurred. A year and a half later, in May 2022, when more Israeli officials visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi leaders about critical security matters, nobody tried to hide it. As Israel and Saudi Arabia moved closer, there was a marked shift in how the Saudis saw the Palestinian issue. It once was central to their policy, with successive Saudi leaders making clear that there would be no relations with Israel unless there first was an independent Palestinian state. The Abraham Accords flew in the face of those pundits and partisans alike who chirped for years that Middle East peace was dependent on pleasing (read: held hostage by) the Palestinians. That is, as long as they refused to make peace, the rest of the Muslim world was supposed to support them blindly. Not this time! Saudi Arabia did not object to the Accords between Israel and Arabs that never addressed Palestinians. The Saudis approved of and applauded them heartily. Thus, in March 2022, MBS said “We don’t look at Israel as an enemy, we look to them as a potential ally, with many interests that we can pursue together.” Four years before that, the future Saudi monarch said "It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table or shut up and stop complaining." He further said that Palestinians have rejected one opportunity after another to make peace and that Palestinian statehood is no longer a priority for the Saudis. Others got the message and began following suit.
With talk of normalization discussions heating up recently (and some in the US predicting an agreement within nine to twelve months), incorporating this seismic change in Saudi policy was handled surprisingly simply. The Saudis could not simply ignore this shift, but they also refused to let it stand in the way of a successful negotiation, as have the Palestinians in decades of failed negotiations. They would not let this chance crash and die on the craggy rocks of Palestinian inflexibility. So, yes, they raised the issue of a Palestinian state in the current talks, but it was made clear early on that this would not happen. While Israel was prepared to take a few steps along this dimension, it would not be agreeing to a Palestinian state that still does not accept it as a nation and continues launching terrorist attacks on Israel. According to all sources, we should expect any final agreement to include some concessions for the Palestinians, such as a building freeze or release of funds; but do not expect them to be anything permanent. Those concessions, by the way, likely will help Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the rough and tumbled world of Israeli politics; but that is a matter for an article in itself.
The United States has been a key player in making these agreements happen, with the Arab signers getting something substantial as part of the deal. For the UAE, it was new arms. Regardless of party or President in power, the US is committed to helping Israel maintain its “qualitative military advantage.” Israel is not an existential threat to its neighbors, but they were to it. Israel could face extinction if it ever lost a war, something its Arab belligerents did not have to worry about. That meant the United States would not sell its most advanced weapons to nations formally at war with Israel. But by signing the Abraham Accords, the UAE was no longer a belligerent and as such given access to a whole new body of American weaponry. Bahrain, already firmly integrated into the US defense network in the Gulf, gained greater US commitment in its fight against radical extremism and Iranian threats. Sudan was rewarded by the US removing it from the list of states sponsoring terrorism; and Morocco got US support for its claim to the Western Sahara. If the current talks prove fruitful, Saudi Arabia will be placed under the US nuclear defense umbrella, meaning that any attack on it could face US military action even including its nuclear arsenal. In fact, this has led to serious proposals that would give US Middle East allies the same protection currently enjoyed by South Korea. While some in Washington are hopeful that an Israel-Saudi deal could be inked within a year, US Senator Ted Cruz thinks it will take longer to finalize. An influential member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its subcommittee on the Middle East, he believes that agreement will be reached. The Saudis have told him as much in private. He is less optimistic about the time it will take; telling me that the US still has a lot to do internally to regain its unchallenged position of strength in the region.
What does this mean for Bangladesh? Bangladesh is one of only nine Muslim-majority nations that has no level of relations with Israel. Four of them are in a state of chaos brought about by decades of civil war (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen). That puts Bangladesh in a category with authoritarian and anti-US countries Algeria, Iran, and Pakistan, and Taliban Afghanistan (which had contacts before the Taliban takeover). Is that the group Bangladesh, which prides itself on being a democracy with a foreign policy of “Friendship to all, malice to none”? Are the conditions of their people what Bangladeshi leaders want for their people? I’m betting not and urge the Bangladeshi government to put out the right feelers now. You will find the Israelis very open to it. Remember: Israel was one of the first countries to recognize Bangladeshi independence; and the process began before the War of Independence ended when Acting President Nazrul Islam and Foreign Minister Mastaque Ahmed of the Bengali provisional government requested it. Start some level of relations with Israel, with US support; or risk being at the end of a long line of countries with much less leverage in gaining concessions for the Bangladeshi people.
Dr. Richard Benkin is an American scholar and a geopolitical analyst.
Israel, Saudis in Marathon Recognition Talks: Affirming That the Conflict Is Geopolitical, Not Religious
Dr. Richard Benkin
Originally published in the Daily Asian Age of Dhaka. It is the first part of a two-part article about negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with strong US involvement, that would normalize relations between the two countries and again change the way people understand the Middle East conflicts. It is written to address the people of Bangladesh, whose population is 92 percent Muslim, and whose leaders can use this moment to advance the interests of their people and re-join the democratic alliance against tyranny.
The issue of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia can be a sensitive one given the centrality of the Kingdom in the history of Islam, its being the home of the Kaaba and the site of the Hajj, and the religious overlay attributed to the Israel-Arab conflict; but that sensitivity has changed. The 2020 Abraham Accords de-coupled religion from what is essentially a geopolitical conflict whose anti-Israel partisans have used religion to get people to ignore reality and their own interests in favor of pure propaganda. This soon became very clear. During conflicts in 2021 and 2022, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Iran, and other actors tried to compel support for Islamist and Palestinian attacks by going reflexively to their false claims that “Al Aqsa is at risk,” and the only way to save it is to eradicate Israeli authority over it and Jerusalem. It seemed to work in the past, but this time it fell on deaf ears. Iran might have been the only Muslim-majority nation to ape those cries. Most Muslims refused to be fooled and allow these radical forces to drag them back to a previous era from which they now evolved. And they were not going to subordinate their people’s well-being to that of radical rejectionists. The world had moved on, and it was high time that Palestinian leadership allowed their people to move into the 21st century.
Signed on the White House lawn in Washington, the Abraham Accords saw the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain extend full recognition to Israel; Sudan and Morocco later joined the Accords and embraced Israel as a friend and ally. It resulted in strong people-to-people contacts with Israelis and brought immediate dividends to the peacemakers. None of this, however, could have happened without the tacit approval of Saudi Arabia, which the Kingdom granted heartily.
Israel and Saudi Arabia have been growing closer for some time, with ever increasing cooperation in areas like defense, security, the environment, and business development. While relations were kept secret for a while, they’ve been an open secret for quite some time. Even previous taboos against speaking about it long ago evaporated, and both countries acknowledge the interaction. Two months after the Accords were signed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in the Saudi city of Neom on the Red Sea. It was an historic moment, though Saudi spokesmen still had to deny it occurred. But a year and a half later, in May 2022, more Israeli officials visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi leaders about critical security matters—and this time, nobody tried to hide it.
After the Accords, we also saw a notable shift in how Saudi leaders talked about the Palestinians, who had been held up for years as being the victims of Israeli intransigence and refusal to give them a state. Pundits and partisans alike chirped for years that Middle East peace was dependent on (read: held hostage by) them. But the inconvenient truth of multiple Israeli offers of statehood, and multiple Palestinian rejections without so much as a counteroffer made it clear that Palestinian leaders were never going to accept a Jewish state in the Middle East; and other Muslim leaders had grown frustrated with their refusal to consider negotiation, holding only to their own maximalist demands. Thus, in March 2022, MBS said publicly and without the slightest attempt to hide it, “We don’t look at Israel as an enemy, we look to them as a potential ally, with many interests that we can pursue together.” Four years before that, the future Saudi monarch said "It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table or shut up and stop complaining." He further said that Palestinians have rejected one opportunity after another to make peace and that Palestinian statehood is no longer a priority for the Saudis.
And it shouldn’t be. The Saudis could be in for a difficult future if they do not pivot from an economy dependent on oil revenues to something else. Most of their traditional customers already are weaning themselves off fossil fuels, a process that only will accelerate and leave the Saudi economy in tatters unless it evolves beyond oil. MBS is one of the young Saudi leaders who recognized this need and (often with Israeli help) has been steering the Kingdom’s economy on a more sustainable course. There are not very many ruling monarchies left, let alone any ruling major international players, and MBS knows that it would not take much to push things over the edge—if the Saudis do not modernize. Leaders in power when their people’s economic well-being plummets soon encounter popular anger, social unrest, and often even revolution; and there are plenty of adversaries looking to topple and replace the Saudi monarchy. Besides, modernizing is an obligation leaders owe their constituents. That economic development is well underway among the nations already in the Abraham Accords. Their trade with Israel saw an immediate billion dollar plus jump in trade just from Israel. By the end of 2021, direct Israel-UAE commerce alone exceeded a billion dollars, on top of increased tourism, investment, and trade with the US. UAE officials predict trade with Israel to top $1 trillion over the next decade, and the two countries are putting the final touches on a free-trade agreement. They also have benefitted from Israeli investment in both business and social projects, joint projects in clean energy and other critical areas, and defense purchases from the US and Israel.
Mutual defense was an initial motivation for what has become known as the Sunni alliance with Israel. The Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia have a lot more to fear from Iran than Israel does. Israel has held its own and then some in its conflicts with Iran and its proxies; Arab nations have not done as well. Egypt’s leaders toppled a short-lived Muslim Brotherhood government, which Islamists allied with Iran want to bring back to power, even though it lost the Egyptian people’s support before it was brought down a decade ago. And nations from Jordan to the Gulf States see their unity and alliances with Israel and the United States as their best chance of stopping an imperialistic Iran and their terrorist proxies, like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels. Taking that next step from even open cooperation to full, mutual recognition has been slower because of the religious overlay in which the Israel-Arab conflict has been cast; which is another reason why Saudi recognition of Israel will be so impactful.
Representatives of several Arab and Muslim-majority countries attending the September 15, 2020, signing of the Abraham Accords, with more than a half dozen gleefully telling people that they will be next to join. Change appeared to be happening with lightning speed. Unfortunately, COVID and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine focused attention away from the Middle East; and domestic US politics also slowed momentum for expanding the Accords. President Joe Biden and his administration did not pursue the Accords as actively as did former President Donald Trump. Biden and the Democrats wanted their voters to see the administration as a clear break from everything associated with the Trump Administration, which was their primary reason for electing him. For a while, State Department employees were not even allowed to use the phrase, Abraham Accords. But negotiations never stopped. Intense negotiations are going on now, led by Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen and confirmed as recently as the Spring, on normalizing Israeli ties with Mauritania, Somalia, Niger, and Indonesia; Mauritania seems to be furthest along in the process.
The Saudis were on the White House lawn that day, too, to signal their support for normalization publicly. US Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) told me that he was with the Saudi representative who told him that the Kingdom expected to join the Accords and embrace Israel as a friend and ally; that full recognition was a matter of when, not if. Cruz, who is on the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, & Counterterrorism Subcommittee, also agreed with me that once Saudi Arabia joins the Accords, there will be a rush of Arab and Muslim-majority nations will be lining up to join them.
Over the past weeks, however, there has been a great deal of chatter about intense three-party talks involving the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. We know this is not simply rumor because the individual participants and even issues being discussed have been identified. Sources have confirmed that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer (who also used to be Ambassador to the United States, Israel’s most critical diplomatic post, and Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman (MBS’s brother) are leading the negotiations. All three countries have a great deal to gain from an agreement. For the United States, it would re-assert leadership in the Middle East and more generally, and it would sideline China despite the latter’s brokering a Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement. It is clear to all parties involved, as well as others looking at it from the outside, that the US is the only nation with the strength to insure the deal’s specifics; and that China simply is incapable of doing that.
Israeli officials have told me on several occasions that they are always very keen on building relations with other countries, all but three of which are Arab and Muslim majority. Moreover, Saudi recognition would signal to everyone else that the supposed religious aspect of the conflict does not exist. With that barrier gone, it would not be long before the Israeli economy was fully integrated with those states, providing it with new markets and joint ventures, and opening opportunities for social and humanitarian projects in those countries. (Israel’s humanitarian projects are renowned globally for the countless lives they have saved throughout the world.) Saudi gains were mentioned earlier: developing new economies to take the Kingdom through the 21st century; surviving the end to a fossil fuel based global economy; cementing its regional alliance to defend against an expansionist Iran. In fact, all three nations are key beneficiaries of that international pact.
For each of the three countries, full relations would have a positive impact on their most pressing issues: for Saudi Arabia, military security against attack and the means to evolve their economy; for Israel, further normalization and cooperation with allies; for the United States, a re-asserted geopolitical role and checking Chinese geopolitical expansion.
Dr. Richard Benkin is an American scholar and a geopolitical analyst.
Interview of Dr. Benkin on India in a geopolitical context (Hindi)
Dr. Richard Benkin
Originally published in the blog of Amitabh Tripathi, geopolitical analyst and expert on India and its geopolitical realities, and Hinduism both religious and otherwise.
Amitabh Tripathi ji and I have been working together on a range of issues for years. Because of him, I know that I am never alone in India.
Interview of Dr. Benkin on India-Pakistan Relations
Dr. Richard Benkin
Originally published in India’s Foreign Policy Research Center journal
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UJLDCfqTfcIJRR6RM5hsFXeERM4blBFr/view
For many years, I have been associated with India’s Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) and its driving force, Professor Mahendra Gaur. Periodically, FPRC gathers groups of experts and interviews them regarding relations between India and different nations. This one was about India-Pakistan relations. My response to the questions is on pages 28-36 of the journal, linked above.
Proclamation by Mount Prospect, IL recognizing Days of Remembrance 2023
Mount Prospect, IL: Proclamation Recognizing the Days of Remembrance
Dr. Richard Benkin
Brief acceptance of proclamation from village by Richard Benkin
Good evening.
This is the first night of Passover, which marks the exodus from Egypt and re-establishment of a Jewish homeland in the land of Israel. So, I first wish you all a joyous holiday season, regardless of which holiday you celebrate.
And that’s really what this proclamation is trying to protect: the right of all people to believe and worship as they wish without the government stopping them. At the time of the holocaust, fascism threatened those freedoms, and while freedom ultimately prevailed then, and later against Communism and radical Islamism; we today face a new geopolitical authoritarian alliance; because the enemies of freedom never rest, which is why we can’t ever rest—or forget what happens when they hold sway. That’s also what this proclamation is about.
Four years ago, I visited Buchenwald concentration camp near Weimar Germany to say kaddish, the Jewish prayer for the dead, for a relative of mine interned there. In Buchenwald and other concentration camps, who lived and who died was often a matter of chance. Guards took pot shots at prisoners without regard to whom; people were pulled aside and killed at random. Yet, for whatever reason, my relative survived to have a family. Look around our community. The vast number of American Jews lost family in the holocaust; as did many non-Jewish Americans. All of their descendants here today were in real jeopardy of never having existed if our forebear was randomly killed instead of someone else’s. Genocide takes all of our individualities and puts them into one collective identity, and it doesn’t matter who in that collective is killed.
The holocaust was unique in its centrality to national ideology, its uncompromising nature, and industrial scale; but it has echoes today. As a human rights activist, I have seen them close-up in places and among people who never get the headlines others do: Hindus in Bangladesh, who will not survive past mid-century unless things change; Pashtun Muslims, who face Pakistani terror and cultural jihad, who battled Al Qaeda; stood with me in Buchenwald that day; and fought by our side in Afghanistan, and I’m still trying to get some out.
Today, we lionize Ukraine though it would be difficult to find another country with a more violent history of antisemitism, so firmly embedded in much of the population. Not only were almost a million Ukrainian Jews murdered during the holocaust, but many Ukrainians participated in the killing and joined with the Nazis. (Yes, it’s kind of personal for me, because some of those murdered were my family, an entire section, who lived in a village about eight hours from Kyiv and were killed either in pogroms or at the nearby Belzec death camp.) Yet today—and here’s the point—the face of Ukraine and the patriotic defense of its homeland and people is its Jewish president, whom Ukrainians embrace. A nation and people that took a painful look at history and rose above it.
Yet, right here in Illinois, 15 percent of young adults think the Holocaust is a myth, one in 12 think the Jews caused it; nationally, almost a quarter say it’s a myth. Most of these people aren’t neo-Nazis or conspiracy mongers, but victims of ignorance, which makes our job that much harder—and that much more important.
As a Jewish child growing up after the holocaust, I realized that the Nazis weren’t the real problem. They knew they could not have done all that themselves, and correctly counted on all those “good Europeans,” just looking out for their own, who drove the trains to the death camps, gladly looted empty Jewish homes, or just closed their shutters while their neighbors were being dragged away in the night.
Only by remembering the Holocaust can we live its clarion call of NEVER AGAIN so that we don’t stand by while these things happen. Our village’s refusal to forget the holocaust is a testimony to its people and leaders; and I am eternally grateful for it.
Thank you.
Press Coverage of Dr. Benkin's Appearance, Address, and Meetings in Lucknow
There was extensive press coverage of Richard Benkin’s discussions and public speech in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India in February 2023. This is one example.