A bit before the Iran war, India's Foreign Policy Research Centre interviewed me and others for a journal about US actions in Venezuela. It recently was completed. Not only is it important in and of itself; it also is significant in what it foreshadows. My part is on pages 32-39. Here is the text:
FPRC Journal-J-65
Venezuela Crisis in International Perspective
(1) What does US intervention in Venezuela mean for the International Order? Are the lines between sanctions, seizures and resource wars blurring fastly?
When I was a child, growing up in the big city, getting into fights with both friends and adversaries was a fact of daily life. We would have an argument, and often a fist fight until we were tired or out of vitriol. But there was one boy who would ambush me with a punch or something else along those lines. Then, when I went to retaliate according to our rules, he would run away into his house where the rules said we were not allowed to go. One day, I got so tired of getting punched or kicked that I decided, ‘to heck with it,’ and ran into his house after him and, let’s just say, retaliated. There was a huge cry of foul from the boy, and his parents were up in arms demanding that I be punished in some way. Once the din died down (and I did have to pay for some things I damaged in their house), the incident was forgotten, and we went on with our daily lives—with one exception. That boy never hit me and ran away again, and I was able to enjoy my childhood days in relative peace.
In many ways, that is what happened with United States (US) action in Venezuela. Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro engaged in actions highly detrimental to the United States, and was a major figure running a drug operation targeting American citizens. His actions translated into a vast amount of illegal activities, and the deaths of at least thousands of Americans, usually by overdose, though no one is putting a specific number on that yet. Maduro used his power to facilitate cartel activity to flood the US with illegal drugs, including cocaine and to a lesser extent, fentanyl. And while one might reasonably argue that the drug user is responsible for his or her actions and their consequences, our law enforcement agencies always target the drug dealers and their suppliers in applying our laws. The problem was that, like that boy in my childhood, Maduro would do these things then run behind an international order that enabled his murderous actions. That now has ended, and is changing calculations made by bad actors from Beijing and Moscow to Tehran and as we will see elsewhere, too.
That “rules-based international order” largely was developed in a series of meetings after the Second World War in a world that hardly resembles our own. They were dominated by the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR), which ended over 30 years ago. The decision-makers were all western powers, and even if some non-white nations participated in these discussions, they had little or no impact on the international order. The European colonial powers—primarily the United Kingdom (UK) and France—were exhausted but not yet enough to give up their empires, which still figured in their calculations of what these rules should do. Almost all of Europe and much of Asia were in shambles, most of Africa remained one huge candy store for Europeans; and that does not even consider the technologies that did not exist then. No internet or cyber anything; phones were wired to walls or desks; only one country had nuclear weapons; and even if we had greater technology, most of the world was unconnected to what we had and out of the loop to help craft a just world. Rules favored a select few and were designed to keep Europe relevant in international politics. So, yes, US action in Venezuela was yet another element in the long-overdue process to scrap that elite-centric order and create a new, more realistic one. While US actions were also intended to secure US interests, I tire of hearing self-aggrandizing politicians refer to an international order that has little relevance to what we face today.
But rules only make sense if (1) they are followed and rules breakers face consistent and significant consequences and (2) they are applied consistently and equally to those with whom we agree and those whom we see as adversaries. And using those two parameters; that rules-based order has failed to have continued utility. Two of the most talked about speeches at the recently concluded 56th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland came from Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and French President Emmanuel Macron. They warned their audiences of an end to the international “rules-based” system. Macron called current events “a shift towards a world without rules, where international law is trampled underfoot and where the only law that seems to matter is that of the strongest.” Gee, I wonder how that differs from who was allowed to decide on the current order he so vehemently defends. Perhaps it is the fact that those post-World War II meetings gave his country a seat at the table; while today France is desperately searching for some way to remain a global power. Carney talked about a “rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.” Despite their attempt to seize some sort of moral high ground in the rough and tumbled world of geopolitics, the absolute hypocrisy behind their words rendered their cries hollow. Let us be clear that for Macron, Carney, and others, rules are important only if they are their rules and allow them to run roughshod over others.
Carney, for instance, piously referred to Canada’s “commitment to fundamental values: sovereignty and territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force except when consistent with the UN Charter and respect for human rights.” Yet, under the “rules-based order” he sophomorically mourns, Canada rejects those values if observing them would hurt its own political or other interests. Canada (and France) recognized Bangladesh on February 14, 1972, less than two months after the latter’s War of Independence ended. How did that uphold the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Pakistan? Yet, Canada has done nothing to support Pashtun, Baloch, or Sindhi cries for human rights, justice, or freedom from Pakistan. How does Canada’s vocal support for Khalistani separatists uphold India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity? It does not, but adhering to its stated values would create a domestic political problem for the ruling party. Nor did Canada’s recognition of a Palestinian State on September 21, 2025, uphold the sovereignty of Israel but rather strengthened a new order by which moral cowards ratify the principle that terrorism can bring desired political results. But Canada acts differently if the particular country is one it likes, like Spain, or does not carry implications for Canada’s internal politics. Canada makes statements about the right to self-determination but calls Basque and Catalan independence internal Spanish matters. Perhaps it fears that consistency in that rules-based order would mean letting go of Quebec, which gores its own ox. This is not to say that Canada is uniquely awful, it is just that Carney’s attempt to clothe his and Macron’s desperate attempt at relevance in moral verbiage ignores the race-based and anachronistic nature of the order he upholds.
To return to the question posed, events including those in Venezuela are part of crafting a new international order that is changing how we define those actions; but that has been in process for quite some time. The current danger is best expressed by a concept developed by William Ogburn, an American sociologist from early in the 20th century. “Cultural lag” recognizes that technology advances more quickly than how we humans respond to it, and refers to the period during which the two move closer. That is where we have been with the international order for at least a half century—not chaos but a process that still has a ways to go. We do not know what the rules will be, nor the process that ultimately determines them.
(2) US action in Venezuela reminds us of Monroe Doctrine
with Trump flavour. Do you agree?
As an American, I constantly have to check myself and realize that my perspective, bundle of facts, and understandings are shaped by my nationality and are not necessarily shared by others. So, here goes. As an American, I appreciate that President Trump is defending American interests against bad actors, such as Maduro, the Islamists occupying Iran, its proxies, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is now undisputed that over the past few decades, entities outside of the Americas have embedded themselves in the Western Hemisphere, often leading enterprises that work against the interests of the United States and of democracy in the region; groups and nations like Hamas and Hezbollah, China and the CCP, Iran, and others. Venezuela had become a junior partner to China and Iran in the Axis of Evil, an outpost for them in South America, and a petrol station for others in the Axis; major partners with long term geopolitical aims like China, and others just holding on for dear life like Cuba. Thus, in that way US interdiction of Maduro was consonant with traditional interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, but there is more to it than that.
The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in a world that has very little in common with today’s global community—starting with the fact that back then, there was no “global community.” The European powers still had colonies in the Americas: Britain held Canada and several Caribbean territories; France held onto Haiti and other islands; the Dutch owned several Caribbean islands; Portugal still had Brazil; multiple countries had slices of Guyanas; Spain was still in possession of Florida; and so forth. The Monroe Doctrine warned those European powers not to try to extend their colonies. Today, the United States and other western nations face new infiltration from outside the Americas, and Venezuela was a great example of how China, for instance, could build a base of operations without planting its flag. Thus, Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have modernized the Doctrine to send a message that these and other new methods of conquest are now in US crosshairs. Donald Trump has made it clear that he no longer will sublimate real interests to the niceties demanded by outdated gentlemen’s agreements.
This new Monroe Doctrine, if you will, recognizes that foreign entities will take advantage of space provided them by governments not friendly to the United States and the Axis of Democracy led by the United States, India, Israel, and others. In 2025, we saw an indigenous and mass movement that shrunk that space without US force. That year saw nations including Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, and several smaller ones throw off leftist governments hostile to the United States in favor of conservative governments that are now working with the US to evict Old World influence; and Argentina strengthened its conservative majority in 2025 elections. Many observers have claimed that the left is dead in Latin America. The hemisphere has definitely shifted right through popular and free elections, leaving only Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay with leftist governments. Brazil and Columbia have national elections in 2026 that could bring changes there, and Cuba is in bad shape after Maduro’s fall. Many see that nation’s government falling in 2026. Mexico is a special case and is working cooperatively with the Trump administration and is doing what Madura refused to do via-a-vis drug cartels.
Perhaps, germane to the question, Trump’s real corollary to the Monroe Doctrine has been to create conditions to help Latin American nations themselves reject foreign domination. At his Senate confirmation hearings to become Secretary of State, Marco Rubio spoke eloquently about his desire to re-emphasize Latin America in US foreign policy. The son of Cuban immigrants, Rubio laid out both the challenges and the opportunities; since then, he has helped shepherd strong US engagement with the region. That is, the “Trump flavour” is US engagement with the rest of the Americas, rather than how it reacts after bad situations occur, such as that which existed in Venezuela.
(3) Why has India chosen to play down the US action in
Venezuela? Do you believe India’s response to Venezuela
crisis may “backfire” in Long Run.
Between the time that FPRC sent me these questions and the time I started writing about them, India and the United States reached a trade agreement. In the negotiations leading up to that agreement, the most contentious issue between the two countries was arguably India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil. From an American perspective, India was helping to fund Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine, and from an Indian perspective, the United States was trying to make it give up an important element fueling a surging Indian economy. Negotiations began with one side (India) taking the position that it should continue to purchase Russia energy without being harassed for it by the US; and the other side (US) taking the position that it must stop entirely and right away. That is a pretty wide gulf between them, and negotiators had to figure out how to bridge it.
Americans by and large are convinced that India’s Russian energy purchases are a major source of funds that enable Putin to continue his war in Ukraine. Since stopping that war is an important element in current US policy, this is a problem. But almost all of the American negotiators also recognize that a strong Indian economy is very much in the interests of the United States. Further complicating the task of replacing Russian crude is the fact that India has been able to purchase that energy at seriously discounted rates. While India already had been reducing its purchases of Russian oil, Russia remained its largest source in 2025, accounting for 37 percent of its total imports. From mid-2024 until mid-2025, India purchased small amounts of Venezuelan oil under a special waiver of sanctions. This month, however, it started buying Venezuelan crude in greater quantities. With the US now controlling the sanction-free Venezuelan tap, India can buy more of that oil and reduce its purchases of Russian crude. A major conundrum interfering with a US-India trade deal was solved, and 34 days after Maduro’s capture, India and the US inked their trade agreement. Coincidence? Hardly, and it helps explain India’s muted reaction to the US action. Moreover, India was not at all alone in its response. Outside the Western Hemisphere, only adversarial states like China and Russia condemned the US move. But while other countries waited for possible benefits from the fall of the dictator, India is already benefitting from Maduro’s downfall and (hopefully) Venezuela’s return to democracy. It is difficult to see how this could “backfire” on India. Despite periodic words defending the old order that never worked for India and other countries of the Global South, nations and their representatives recognize that in today’s world, all nations will pursue their own interests, entering into bi-lateral agreements with a variety of others that might or might not be aligned with them on other issues. And that is exactly what India did in the negotiation and in its result.
(4) US action in Venezuela will spur Xi to invade Taiwan, and
embolden Putin to launch fresh onslaught on Ukraine. Do
you agree?
No, I do not; quite the opposite. If the premise of these questions is that the US operation in Venezuela is ushering in a world without rules other than the rule of the powerful; Xi has to figure that a Chinese attempt to conquer and seize Taiwan is likely to be met with a response of greater power. If, on the other hand, the reality is my perspective (viz. that nations will no longer be hampered by an anachronistic and Western-centric set of rules and can use their power of whatever variant to pursue their own interests and thwart attempts to undermine them); then Xi still has to figure that a Chinese attempt to conquer and seize Taiwan is likely to be met with a response of greater power since a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be contrary to the interests of the United States and its Pacific allies. Either way, he knows that such efforts would not be against Taiwan alone, but against a consortium of Pacific democracies. He has seen the US build up those Pacific allies, including the Philippines, which is only about 300 kilometers from Taiwan at their closest point.
Should Xi decide to invade Taiwan nonetheless, he likely would face immediate economic sanctions by the United States, and in addition, secondary sanctions that would make doing business with China more expensive than it is worth for most countries. Looking at previous US actions, we can expect that sanctions will not clampdown entirely but include carve outs for both the United States and other nations. This, too, is using economic and other power to maximize their value to prevent harmful actions without taking down important allies at the same time. It is undoubtedly not lost on Xi that Trump won the 2024 election in part by emphasizing that these sort of aggressive actions, specifically Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’s terror attack on Israel, would not have happened if he had been President; something he has said numerous times since. Trump is unlikely to allow Xi to humiliate him by doing the very thing he says could not happen when the US uses its strength.
Analysts are almost unanimous in agreeing that China’s window of opportunity to attack Taiwan closes after 2027, the final year of Xi’s current term and his final opportunity to set his legacy. It also, according to most analysts, is the year of a critical benchmark for military readiness and capabilities in its modernization program. Trump will be President through January 2029, and if someone like Marco Rubio or Vice President JD Vance is elected President after him, Xi can expect that same policy to stand at least through January 2033 or 2038.
Again, looking at power and its assets, China really has only two vis-à-vis the United States. The first is nuclear weapons, which except for death-cult millenarian leaders like those currently occupying Iran, are unlikely to be used for anything other than deterrence. The more immediate is China’s rare earths. Almost since his first day in office, Trump has been acquiring new sources of rare earths (though some remain in development) to reduce its dependence on the Chinese stash. Moreover, given Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor and AI chip production; a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be seen in the US as a gambit to make the US and its military dependent on China. Americans would never let that happen.
Thus, if we are entering an era where nations pursue their interests irrespective of that antiquated set of rules; it should be crystal clear to Chinese policy-makers that an attempt to seize Taiwan on their part would be met with a level or force they would not be able to overcome; that the US would not sublimate the effectiveness of its response in order to bow to rules that its adversaries ignore.
(5) Europe’s ‘lame’ response to Trump’s action in Venezuela is
flat out dangerous? Do you agree?
Your characterization of the European response is spot on accurate. We know that some European leaders detest Trump’s American bluntness and unapologetic pursuit of American interests. For decades, they suckled at the American defense teat and used the savings to build a now-institutionalized welfare state that would be unsustainable without the US spending its tax payers’ money on European defense. And—this is from a subjective American viewpoint—then out of what Schopenhauer called their ressentiment, looked down their collective noses at Americans as unsophisticated boors who mess their hands with things like earning money and defense. Now, many of those same people are speaking as if increased defense spending is their idea and that it will give them a level of independence. In reality, they would not have taken that decision unless Trump used US dominance to force them. That “lame” response combines a fear of consequences for angering Donald Trump and an almost knee-jerk, leftist opposition to what he tells them is only fair.
I do not, however, find Europe’s reaction dangerous; lame, yes, dangerous no. There would be danger in it only if Europe had some agency, but it does not. For years, I have been telling people in Washington and elsewhere that America’s future lies not with Europe, but with Asia, especially India and Israel. Europe is a declining power and has been for some time. Almost all observers of the Second World War agree that by its end, Great Britain was the “junior partner” of the alliance (whether the three anti-Nazi nations or the two anti-Communist ones)—and that was over 80 years ago. The defeat of Winston Churchill as its Prime Minister in 1945 can be considered a turning point. Churchill was lauded (and rightfully so) as a great wartime leader who projected British strength and resolve better than anyone. It was he who led the British to stand firm—even if alone—in recognizing the Nazi threat and fighting it. But in the 1945 election, Britons rejected that projection of power on the world stage, and voted in favor of turning inward by electing Labour’s Clement Atlee who ran almost entirely on domestic issues. And even though in the years since World War II, British Prime Ministers have been split relatively evenly between Labour and Conservatives; even the latter (with a few notable exceptions) tended to be judged by how well they built the welfare state. The rest of Europe largely followed suit. With all that capital invested in social programs throughout the continent, which also included generous vacation and leave that reduced work days, its military might inexorably declined. Today, all but a few European countries have any sort of military presence. The UK and France have nuclear weapons but no evidence of an effective conventional military; Germany has developed a strong weapons industry but still constrains its military might; Poland might be the one European country with its military strength on the rise. Economically, Europe still has a considerable consumer market that most countries want, and its industries still produce many products that people globally covet. But even that is changing.
In 1960, the three largest economies by Gross Domestic Product were, in order, the United States, UK, and France. In 2025, it was the United States, China, and Germany, with enormous gaps between the US and China and between China and Germany. In 1960, eight of the top 15 economies were European; today, it is just five. China, Germany, Japan, and India all have surpassed France and the UK. That is especially ironic within the context of this discussion. When the international order was created after World War II, China was in shambles and undergoing a deadly civil war, Germany and Japan were defeated in all aspects of national power and were forced to live under occupation, and India was a British colony. If anything, this should tell us all that it is high time, if not overdue, to scrap that world order and replace it with something that reflects today’s realities.
One final note. As this is being written, the world anxiously awaits a joint attack on Iran by the United States and Israel. Many people—especially the people of Iran—believe that the attack will help bring about the downfall of the 47-year-old Islamist government. One of the very first things that Islamist government did was to kidnap and hold between 52 and 66 American embassy personnel as hostages for 444 days, but the US held off doing all it could do to liberate them and engaged in seemingly endless and unproductive negotiations. That did at least as much as Maduro’s abduction to signal that the rules-based international order was effectively dead, and any nation that found it in its interest could ignore it. For its almost five decades in existence, that Islamist government made it a seminal part of its policy to destroy Israel utterly and murder or convert all of its people; and to arm terrorist proxies throughout the Middle East to kill Israelis and elsewhere in the world to kill Jews (such as the bombing of a synagogues in Argentina and Turkey). Israel, too, relented in favor of that international order, for as we saw in 2024 and 2025, it did not stop because it lacked the ability to defeat Iran and its proxies. And for all its malign actions, what consequences did the Iranian regime face under that rules-based order? Until the United States imposed and enforced sanctions, virtually none. It has been feted at the United Nations, often given the chair of organizations dedicated to stamping out the violence and bigotry that are essential elements of the Islamist regime. Countries have conducted extensive business with it, providing the Islamist regime with the money it used to fund its terror proxies and pursue nuclear weapons to carry out is evil designs. This exposed a so-called rules-based order that applied its rules selectively to suit prevailing ideologies and economic interests.